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 INTRODUCTION  
¶1 The patent world is quietly undergoing a change of seismic proportions. In a few short years, a 
handful of entities have amassed vast treasuries of patents on an unprecedented scale. To give some 
sense of the magnitude of this change, our research shows that in a little more than five years, the 
most massive of these has accumulated 30,000-60,000 patents worldwide, which would make it the 
5th largest patent portfolio of any domestic US company and the 15th largest of any company in the 
world.  
¶2 Although size is important in understanding the nature of the shift, size alone is not the issue. It 
is also the method of organization and the types of activities that are causing a paradigm shift in the 
world of patents and innovation. 
¶3 These entities, which we call mass aggregators, do not engage in the manufacturing of products 
nor do they conduct much research. Rather, they pursue other goals of interest to their founders and 
investors. Non-practicing entities have been around the patent world for some time, and in the past, 
they have fallen into two broad categories.1 The first category includes universities and research 
laboratories, which tend to have scholars engaged in basic research and license out inventions rather 
than manufacturing products on their own. The second category includes individuals or small groups 
who purchase patents to assert them against existing, successful products. Those in the second 
category have been described colloquially as “trolls,” which appears to be a reference to the 
children’s tale of the three billy goats who must pay a toll to the troll waiting under the bridge if they 
wish to pass. Troll activity is generally reviled by operating companies as falling somewhere between 
extortion and a drag on innovation.2 In particular, many believe that patent trolls often extract a 
disproportionate return, far beyond the value that their patented invention adds to the commercial 
product, if it adds at all.3 
¶4 The new mass aggregator, however, is an entirely different beast. To begin with, funding sources 
for mass aggregators include some very successful and respectable organizations, including 
manufacturing companies such as Apple, eBay, Google, Intel, Microsoft, Nokia, and Sony, as well as 
academic institutions such as the University of Pennsylvania and Notre Dame, and other entities 
such as the World Bank and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. Nations such as China, 
France, South Korea, and Taiwan even have their own mass aggregators to varying degrees. 
¶5 Moreover, the acquisition appetites and patent supply sources are quite interesting. Mass 
aggregators may have portfolios that range across vastly different areas of innovation from 
computers to telecommunications to biomedicine to nanotechnology.4 In some of the acquisition 
                                                
1 Sannu K. Shrestha, Trolls or Market Makers? An Empirical Analysis of Nonpracticing Entities, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 114, 115 
(“NPEs are firms that rarely or never practice their patents, instead focusing on earning licensing fees.”); U.S. FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION, 2011 WL 
838912 at 60 (2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf  (“NPE also commonly refers to firms 
that obtain nearly all of their patents through acquisition or purchase in order to assert them against manufacturers.”); see also 
Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 
1571, 1572 (2009).   
2 Chien, supra note 1 at 1577-78 (“The term NPE generally refers to a patentee that does not make products or ‘practice’ its 
inventions.”); Jeremiah S. Helm, Comment, Why Pharmaceutical Firms Support Patent Trolls: The Disparate Impact of eBay v. 
Mercexchange on Innovation, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 331, 333 (2006) (distinguishing between universities and 
patent trolls); Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 629-30 (2008) 
(distinguishing between universities as non-practicing entities and trolls); Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent 
Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1810 (2007) (“‘[P]atent troll’ . . . is a derogatory term for firms that 
use their patents to extract settlements rather than license or manufacture technology.”); see also Jay P. Kesan, Transferring Innovation, 
77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2169, 2193 (2009) (cautioning universities against appearing troll-like because patent trolls are perceived 
unsympathetically). 
3 See Lemley, supra note 2, at 613-14; Magliocca, supra note 2 at 1810 (“Critics claim that these firms are little more than 
blackmailers who put a crippling tax on productive enterprises.”). 
4 Pharmaceuticals seems to be the one technical area generally excluded from mass aggregation, perhaps because the 
pharmaceutical innovation system has evolved to include lesser degrees of technical sharing. 
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activity, mass aggregators purchase large chunks, and even the majority, of an operating company’s 
patents and patent applications. They typically pay cash up front, as well as a share of any future 
profits generated from asserting the patents against anyone other than the selling manufacturer. Mass 
aggregators have engaged in other unusual acquisition approaches as well, including purportedly 
purchasing the rights to all future inventions by researchers at universities in developing countries. 
Other acquisition approaches purportedly include targeted purchases of patents that are of particular 
interest to the mass aggregators’ investors. 
¶6 The types of returns promised to investors and the types of benefits offered to participants are 
also quite different from garden-variety non-practicing entities, as are some of the tactics used in 
organizing the entities and in asserting the patents. Finally, the scale itself is simply mind-boggling. 
Mass aggregators operate on a scale and at a level of sophistication and complexity that would have 
been unimaginable a decade ago. They have taken the prototype strategies pioneered by a prior 
generation of non-practicing entities and changed them into some of the cleverest strategies yet seen 
in the intellectual property rights field. 
¶7 The goal of this article is to shed some light on mass aggregators. We hope to provide some 
understanding of the nature of the change, to analyze its economics and implications, and to offer 
some normative considerations. In the descriptive section, we focus on the oldest and largest of the 
mass aggregators, Intellectual Ventures, which has gone to great lengths to maintain secrecy. 
Working from public sources and investing thousands of hours of research, we offer a detailed 
picture of the entity, tracing through approximately 1300 shell companies and thousands of patents. 
The section also describes in brief form several other mass aggregators, including ones that are public 
companies. 
¶8 In the analytic section, we examine the potential implications of mass aggregators for the patent 
system specifically, for innovation in general, and for the economy as a whole. We look at the 
potential positive effects that mass aggregators might bring, including facilitating appropriate rewards 
for forgotten inventors, creating a market to connect innovators with those who can manufacture 
their inventions, and, most important, operating as a form of insurance—something akin to an Anti-
Troll defense fund. 
¶9 On the other side, we look at the potential economic dangers of mass aggregators and the 
market for patent monetization they create. Given the imperfections of the patent system and the 
odd characteristics of the product created by the market for patent monetization, mass aggregators 
may serve as a tax on current production that reduces future innovation. Characteristics of the 
market may also provide opportunities for anticompetitive behavior. 
¶10 Finally, we offer a few preliminary, normative observations on whether and to what extent the 
sovereign, in the form of various governmental bodies, should become involved in these market-level 
changes. The section also considers broadly the types of changes that would have to occur for such 
participation to take place in a meaningful and minimally disruptive fashion. 
I. FACTS 
¶11 Over the last five years, information about mass aggregators has slowly filtered out into the 
patent community. Initial information was fueled largely by speculation as well as quiet, oblique 
comments from those bound by confidentiality agreements or concerned about incurring the wrath 
of the aggregators. As a reporter researching one of the mass aggregators noted as recently as July 
2011, 
[W]e called people who had licensing arrangements with [Intellectual Ventures], we called 
people who were defendants in lawsuits involving [Intellectual Ventures] patents, we called 
every single company being sued by Oasis Research. No one would talk to us.5 
                                                
5 Alex Blumberg & Laura Sydell, This American Life: When Patents Attack (National Public Radio broadcast, July 22, 2011) 
(transcript available at http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2011/07/25/138576167/when-patents-attack) (noting that the 
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¶12 We encountered similar reticence when we first began trying to understand the structure and 
activities of aggregators. “You can’t find out anything about them; don’t even try,” is a chant that has 
been whispered in intellectual property circles for a number of years. It motivated us to take a hard 
look, and the information eventually unraveled like the yarn from an old sweater. 
¶13 A literature search on Intellectual Ventures reveals many opinions about the company but few 
independent facts. We have aimed to fill that void by tracing the intellectual property assets that the 
company appears to own, identifying the sources of those assets, and describing the company’s 
activities. The data we provide here is the result of four years of painstaking research, piecing 
together bits of information available from public sources. 
A. Intellectual Ventures 
¶14 Much about Intellectual Ventures is shrouded in secrecy. Intellectual Ventures has acknowledged 
that it intentionally withholds the true scope and nature of its IP portfolio.6 Its licensing transactions 
and interactions are protected by strict nondisclosure agreements, and the structure of its business 
activities makes it difficult to get a handle on the full extent of its activities. For example, our 
research has identified more than a thousand shell companies that Intellectual Ventures has used to 
conduct its intellectual property acquisitions, and it has taken considerable effort to identify these. 
The range and scope of its activities are so vast that it is difficult to conceptualize the reach of 
Intellectual Ventures. 
¶15 Intellectual Ventures was founded in 2000 by Nathan Myhrvold and Edward Jung, both of 
whom formerly served in high-level positions at Microsoft.7 Peter Detkin also played a key 
management role in developing Intellectual Ventures.8 In one of patent law’s great ironies, Detkin 
coined the derogatory term “patent troll” during his tenure as the chief intellectual property officer at 
Intel.9 
¶16 Although operations began in 2000, Intellectual Ventures does not appear to have begun its 
massive patent acquisitions in earnest until somewhere around 2004 or 2005, when the annual 
number of acquisitions transaction we could identify rose from a handful to several hundred. 
¶17 According to Intellectual Ventures, invention per se is its product, and both Myhrvold and Detkin 
have referred to the company’s business model as “Invention Capitalism.” They define Invention 
Capitalism as applying concepts from venture capital and private equity to develop and commercially 
exploit new inventions.10 
¶18 Although Intellectual Ventures is designed to make money from trading in patent rights, the 
founders describe their activities as ones that will incentivize research and development in all 
technical subjects. Myhrvold, for example, has been quoted as saying the following: 
Most of people think of research as a charity, a philanthropic thing. They don’t view it as a 
for-profit venture.  So our goal is to make research something you can invest in.  I think it’s 
                                                                                                                                            
reluctance was fueled in part by fear and in part by Intellectual Ventures’ nondisclosure agreement, rumored to be the strictest in 
Silicon Valley). 
6 See Victoria Slind-Flor, The Goodfellas: Detkin and Myhrvold on Patents, Trolls & Intellectual Ventures, 19 INTELL. ASSET MGMT. 
28, 34 (noting that Intellectual Ventures will not reveal how many patents it has or the entities to which it has licensed technology, 
and quoting Myhrvold’s response that “We’re a private company. We don’t disclose our investment plans any more than Warren 
Buffet does.”); see also Steve Lohr, Turning Patents into ‘Invention Capital’, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2010, at B1 (paraphrasing Myhrvold as 
saying that Intellectual Venture’s “penchant for secrecy” is a legacy from its startup days when it “did not want to tip its hand”). 
7 Intellectual Ventures LLC was formed on September 21, 1999. Corporations Division – Registration Data Search, WASH. 
SEC. OF STATE, http://www.sos.wa.gov/corps/search_detail.aspx?ubi=601981783 (last visited Nov. 15, 2011). Nathan Myhrvold 
formerly served as Microsoft’s chief technology officer, and Jung served as Microsoft’s chief architect. Our Team, INTELLECTUAL 
VENTURES, http://intellectualventures.com/WhoWeAre/OurTeam.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2011). 
8 Detkin joined Intellectual Ventures in 2002. Peter N. Detkin, Leveling the Patent Playing Field, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 636 n.* (2007), available at  http://www.jmripl.com/Publications/Vol6/Issue4/Detkin.pdf.  
9 Id. at 636 (stating that he coined the term); Brenda Sandburg, You May Not Have a Choice. Trolling for Dollars, THE RECORDER 
(July 30, 2001), http://www.phonetel.com/pdfs/LWTrolls.pdf (using the term and attributing it to Detkin). 
10 See Detkin, supra note 8, at 636 n.*; Lohr, supra note 6 (citing Nathan Myhrvold); Nathan Myhrvold, The Big Idea: Funding 
Eureka, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW, Mar. 2010, at 40, available at http://hbr.org/2010/03/the-big-idea-funding-eureka/ar/1. 
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a valuable investment if you know what you’re doing.  So we think that if we supply capital 
and expertise in the right way then we can make a hell of an investment and if we are 
successful at doing it, the net research budget will go up.11 
¶19 The scope of Intellectual Ventures’ activities is so vast that it is difficult to contemplate the reach 
of the company. It has invested in innovations and technologies across a broad spectrum of 
industries—everything from computer hardware to biomedicine to consumer electronics to 
nanotechnology. In more than 1,000 transactions, by our count, the company has acquired 
inventions and related intellectual property from individual inventors, corporations of all sizes, 
governments, research laboratories, and universities. 
¶20 Getting a handle on the scope and activities of an entity as secretive as Intellectual Ventures is 
not easy.12 We have tried to create a picture of the company by piecing together information from 
publicly available sources. These sources include the patent assignment records of the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO); the USPTO’s PAIR database,13 which includes the file 
histories of patents; the USPTO’s patent and application database; government records for key 
states, including Delaware, Nevada, Washington, and California; Internal Revenue Service filings for 
non-profit entities; Securities and Exchange Commission data from 10Q and 10K filings by 
corporations; the Federal Register; filings made in dozens of litigations; and press releases and other 
publications from various entities. 
¶21 The structure of the Intellectual Ventures network of operations makes it tremendously difficult 
to detect and trace the company’s activities. For example, Intellectual Ventures has acknowledged 
that it uses shell companies for purchasing and holding patents, although it has not publicly identified 
the number of shells or their names.14 In 2006, one magazine identified 50 shell companies that it 
believed were being operated by Intellectual Ventures. Our research has pieced together 1276 shell 
companies associated with Intellectual Ventures. We do not believe that we have identified all of the 
Intellectual Ventures shell companies, but these 1276 companies alone hold roughly 8000 US patents 
and 3000 pending US patent applications as of May 2011.15 
¶22 Even with some knowledge of the shell companies, tracking the Intellectual Ventures portfolio is 
complicated by the fact that Intellectual Ventures has at times neglected to record its ownership for 
long periods of time. In some cases, for example, we found parties indicating that they had sold or 
licensed patents to Intellectual Ventures—even to the point of identifying the intellectual property 
with great particularity—but we could not locate a corresponding assignment in the USPTO 
database.16  
¶23 Although Intellectual Ventures has never divulged the precise nature and extent of its portfolio, 
the company has reported that it holds some 35,000 “invention assets.”17  The company does not 
define the term, but we assume that this phrase refers not only to patents but also to patent 
applications, non-filed invention disclosures,18 design patents, trademarks, and any trade secrets 
                                                
11 Nathan Myhrvold, Speech at the Churchill Club in Palo Alto, CA (Feb. 27, 2007). 
12 Credit for this exhaustive research goes to co-author Tom Ewing. 
13 PAIR stands for Patent Application Information Retrieval. 
14 See Slind-Flor, supra note 6, at 32 (quoting Peter Detkin as acknowledging that Intellectual Ventures uses shells for 
acquisitions and noting that many companies do this to keep potential liabilities of the acquired company from affecting the whole 
organization). 
15 At least 175 of the patents acquired by Intellectual Ventures have reached the end of their terms and expired. Likewise, 
many more of their patents will expire in just a few years. We have not checked patent maintenance fee payment information to 
determine if any of the other patents have expired due to failure to pay maintenance fees. In any event, the “active” US portfolio is 
likely a bit smaller than suggested by the numbers above. 
16 In one case, Intellectual Ventures opted not to record a change of ownership for 2506 days following execution. An 
assignment for US Publication No. 20090254972 was executed on Aug. 9, 2002, but not recorded until June 19, 2009. See , USPTO 
ASSIGNMENTS ON THE WEB, http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (search “Publication Number” for  
“20090254972”).  
17 Press Release, Intellectual Ventures, BlueCat Networks Signs Patent Agreement With Intellectual Ventures (June 28, 2011), 
available at http://intellectualventures.com/newsroom/pressreleases/11-06-
28/BlueCat_Networks_Signs_Patent_Agreement_With_Intellectual_Ventures.aspx. 
18 The company has claimed to have some 3000 unfiled invention disclosures. See Tom Ewing, Inside the World of Public 
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owned or licensed by the company. Further confusing the issue is whether the company counts as 
“invention assets” patents or only patent families. The company also is not clear about where these 
assets exist, but we assume that this number represents the company’s worldwide portfolio. If the 
35,000 number were to represent the company’s United States portfolio alone, Intellectual Ventures 
would hold a portfolio larger than IBM’s United States portfolio, which is generally acknowledged as 
the largest domestic portfolio. 
¶24 To give a fuller picture of precisely what Intellectual Ventures owns, we assembled as much 
information as possible from public sources on the company’s holdings that are actually patents. To 
summarize the information below, we estimate that Intellectual Ventures has a worldwide portfolio 
of 30,000-60,000 patents and applications as of May 2011. This would mean that in just a few short 
years, Intellectual Ventures has acquired at least the 5th largest patent portfolio among US companies 
and approximately the 15th largest patent portfolio worldwide.19 
B. Patents and Applications Held by Intellectual Ventures 
¶25 With a great deal of digging, we were able to locate 1276 shell companies and related entities that 
appear to be associated with Intellectual Ventures.20 These companies hold approximately 8000 US 
patents and 3000 pending US patent applications. We do not believe that we have found all of the 
shell companies.21 Nevertheless, we believe we can calculate a reasonable approximation of 
Intellectual Ventures’ patent holdings. The overall size of Intellectual Venture’s portfolio can be 
estimated in several ways based on the information that we have obtained. The estimate below comes 
from what we have learned about these 1276 shell companies.22 
¶26 We begin by using information about Intellectual Venture’s shell companies. First, we have 
identified some 50 shells that appear to serve a management function, one shell that serves a 
trademark function, a dozen or so that serve investment functions. Of the remaining 1200 
companies, 954 companies have patents recorded against their names, and some 242 shells do not 
have patents recorded against their names, although some of them clearly hold licensed-in patent 
rights.  
¶27 We have noticed that Intellectual Ventures has a pattern of establishing a shell to receive assets 
well before the transaction related to those assets has been completed. Thus, we suspect that at least 
some of the 242 companies without patents recorded against their names are awaiting allocation of 
assets from a patent-related transaction. We suspect that others have already experienced a patent-
related transaction, but that the transaction has yet to surface in the public record. For example, if 
Intellectual Ventures receives an exclusive license to a patent, the effect would be similar to owning 
the patent outright, but the parties would not necessarily record a change of patent ownership with 
                                                                                                                                            
Auctions, 42 INTELL. ASSET MGMT. 67 (2010).   
19 Patent holdings are difficult to compare and rank because, among other things, to be completely accurate, one must 
account for patents expired on the basis of age and/or failure to pay annuity/maintenance fees. 
20 The shell companies that we know about seem to serve the following functions: 1201 patent holding shells, 1 trademark 
holding shell, 51 asset management shells, and 24 executive and investment shells. See Appendix C for a further discussion of 
research methodology. 
21 As noted elsewhere, we have found approximately 100 other companies registered in Delaware that appear to be shell 
companies but do not presently hold patents. We will continue to monitor these companies. 
22 The size of Intellectual Ventures’ portfolio can also be estimated based upon how much the company has spent acquiring 
this portfolio and how much they have spent per patent. As an arbitrage buyer, one could assume that Intellectual Ventures spends 
roughly the same amount per patent in all of its purchases. Myhrvold reported that Intellectual Ventures had spent $1.163 billion 
acquiring patents by May, 2009. Nigel Page, IV Shifts Gear, 36 INTELL. ASSET MAG. 9, 10 (2009). In a study of Ocean Tomo patent 
auctions, we concluded that Intellectual Ventures had spent a little more than $61 million acquiring 410 US patents and their 
foreign counterparts at an average cost of $148,966 per US patent obtained. Tom Ewing, Publicly Auctioned Patent Buyers, 34 
AVANCEPT (2010). Some published reports have said that Intellectual Ventures pays only $40,000 per patent. Page, supra at 13. 
Application of this information combined with additional information about the growth of Intellectual Ventures’ portfolio since 
May, 2009 leads to an estimated US portfolio of 10,149 US patents and 27,649 foreign patents by May, 2011 along with several 
thousand pending applications worldwide. This second estimate fits well with the estimate based upon analysis of patent-holding 
shell companies. 
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the USPTO, especially if the recipient of the exclusive license believed it highly unlikely that the 
registered patent owner would resell the patent to someone else. 
¶28 The 954 shell companies that have patents recorded against their names have an average of 8.5 
patents and 3.2 patent applications per company. Assuming that the other 242 shell companies 
contain unrecorded transactions, and applying these averages would yield another 2057 patents and 
774 applications. Adding these missing patents and applications to our totals would yield roughly 
10,000 patents and 3700 applications.23 
¶29 Intellectual Ventures also claims that it files roughly 500 applications per year and that it is now 
one of the top 50 US patent filers. The company is somewhat vague as to whether these 500 
applications comprise just those from its invention sessions or whether further filings24 from 
purchased portfolios are included in this total. In any event, given that patent applications publish 18 
months after filing, there should be roughly 750 presently unpublished patent applications as of May 
2011.25 Including unpublished applications keeps our estimate of US patents at 10,000 but the 
number of applications rises to roughly 4400. 
¶30 The actual portfolio may be substantially smaller or larger than this estimate suggests. For 
example, if Intellectual Ventures has been more prompt about recording assignments than appears to 
be the case, then the portfolio may be smaller. Conversely, if Intellectual Ventures has significantly 
more shell companies than we have found, then the portfolio may be substantially larger than our 
estimate. 
¶31 Despite having uncovered more than 1200 shell companies, we have little doubt that other shell 
companies have been formed. Exclusive licenses granted to Intellectual Ventures represent the 
greatest source of unknown patents since these agreements may not necessarily be recorded against 
the patents to which they pertain. For example, we are aware of transactions involving the University 
of Rhode Island and Campinas State University in Brazil, but we have no idea what shell company 
was involved. The University of California, San Diego has reported agreements with five shell 
companies but the patents involved in the licensing arrangement have not been recorded.26 Similarly, 
the US Navy publicly disclosed the licensing of patents to two shell companies, but these licenses 
have not been recorded.27 
¶32 In terms of the non-US portion of the portfolio, we note that approximately half of Intellectual 
Ventures’ US portfolio originated with non-US entities. Many of these came from European entities, 
where intellectual property seems to be particularly undervalued in relation to United States 
intellectual property.28 This suggests that Intellectual Ventures may be acting as an arbitrageur to 
exploit the disparities in intellectual property valuation between the United States and the rest of the 
world. Finally, in contemplating the size of the company’s foreign patents, we note that a sizeable 
portion of the company’s portfolio is fairly young, and as a general matter, younger portfolios are 
prosecuted more vigorously in international jurisdictions than has historically been the case for older 
portfolios.29 
¶33 These factors strongly suggest that a typical US patent in the Intellectual Ventures’ portfolio has 
at least one foreign counterpart. Given that the world has more than 150 patent-granting countries, 
the global scope of any patent portfolio can jump tremendously when the foreign counterparts are 
                                                
23 This estimate does include certain recently acquired portfolios or apparently allied ones. 
24 E.g., continuation applications and reissue applications. 
25 The earliest that an application filed in December 2010 would publish is June 2011, and only if the application had a 
foreign counterpart. Otherwise, the application will typically remain secret until it issues as a patent.   
26 These companies are Eilean Technologies, Jacksonville Timucuan, Discovery Advance, Bettles Gates, and 10Spot. 
27 These companies are Bixenta Ventures and NanoComm Systems. 
28 Gaetan de Rassenfosse, How SMEs Exploit Their Intellectual Property Assets: Evidence from Survey Data 2, 3-4, 8, 18 (Melbourne 
Inst. of Applied Econ. and Soc. Research, Working Paper No. 20/10, 2010), available at 
http://www.springerlink.com/content/g3g2641632872gp3/. 
29 See, e.g., WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WORLD PATENT REPORT, A STATISTICAL REVIEW 7 (2008), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/pdf/wipo_pub_931.pdf. 
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considered.30 Not all patents have a foreign counterpart, however, and most patents do not have 
foreign counterparts in more than a handful of countries. 
¶34 We did not search foreign corporate records, but it is possible that one could find more 
Intellectual Ventures patents that way—not just foreign patents held by Intellectual Ventures but also 
US patents held by the company. For example, we happened upon two examples of this in finding a 
set of US patents that Intellectual Ventures obtained from two foreign companies, only because the 
transactions with the shell companies were mentioned in documents published by the foreign 
company that we discovered during our research.31 
¶35 Based on the information above, we assume that the typical Intellectual Ventures US patent has 
also been filed in two to four foreign jurisdictions as well. Extrapolating only from the US patents, 
and not taking into account any patents Intellectual Venture may have acquired that were filed only 
in foreign jurisdictions, the worldwide portfolio would be roughly 20,000-40,000 patents32 and 9,000-
18,000 applications, by May 2011.  Thus, adding the estimated number of patents and patent 
applications together would suggest a portfolio that ranges from approximately 29,000 to 58,000 
patents and applications worldwide. This range is, of course, an estimate, although a reasonably 
conservative one. Nevertheless, even these figures would place Intellectual Ventures among the 5th 
largest patent portfolio holders in the United States and among the 15th largest patent portfolio 
holders worldwide. 
C. Origins of the Portfolio 
¶36 We were able to find evidence that Intellectual Ventures has engaged in more than 1000 
acquisition transactions. Through these transactions, the company has acquired inventions and 
related intellectual property from individual inventors, corporations of all sizes, governments, 
research laboratories, and universities.33 
¶37 Intellectual Ventures states that its portfolio has been built through transactions variously 
classified as “strategic acquisitions,” “targeted acquisitions,” and “in-bound market-driven” 
opportunities. We suspect that some of the larger transactions also arise in conjunction with an 
investment in Intellectual Ventures by the party supplying the patents. The targeted acquisitions are 
purposeful acquisitions based on either rounding out or completing a portion of Intellectual 
Ventures’ portfolio or a targeted growth area for the future. 
1. Acquisitions Through University Transactions 
¶38 The transactions with universities are particularly interesting, not necessarily as a percentage of 
the company’s portfolio, but as offering insight into Intellectual Ventures’ vision and potential effects 
on innovation. The company has announced that it has relationships with some 400 universities, 
although it has not identified all the institutions involved.34 These relationships are not necessarily 
public because they may involve patents whose ownership remains with the university. For example, 
                                                
30 Additionally, some patent owners continue to count provisional applications and PCT applications as being part of their 
portfolios long after these applications have expired. Similarly, some patent owners double count their EPO patents by counting 
the EPO-published patent applications while also counting the applications’ counterpart issued patents throughout Europe. 
Finally, many patent owners do not distinguish patents granted by examination systems from patents granted by registration 
systems, which causes further confusion. In short, it is easy to inflate the numbers of a patent portfolio once international filing 
occurs.  Discussing “patent families” helps somewhat, although there are also ways making a portfolio appear to have more 
families than it has in actuality. 
31 The two foreign companies noted here are Campinas and Torino Wireless.  
32 This “worldwide” estimate includes the US patents. 
33 Intellectual Ventures often gives the impression that much of its portfolio has been built by acquiring one or two patents 
from small inventors. In reviewing the transactions that we know about, we have found the following distribution of first-level 
sellers: Small and Medium Enterprises, 36.5%; Individual inventors, 25.7%; Large Companies, 15.8%; Consultants and brokerages, 
14.3%; Universities, 5.3%; and Governments, 2.4%. The largest transactions in terms of number of patents involved have come 
from large companies and governments.  
34 Intellectual Ventures Worldwide, INTELLECTUAL VENTURES, http://intellectualventures.com/WhoWeAre/Worldwide.aspx 
(last visited Nov. 15, 2011). 
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the company may simply receive an exclusive license to commercialize the intellectual property 
involved, which would not necessarily appear as a recorded transfer of ownership. Nevertheless, we 
were able to find nearly 50 universities that appear to have signed deals with Intellectual Ventures, 
which we have listed at Appendix A. Some deals may involve sale or licensing of a few patents, some 
may involve investment by the university in Intellectual Ventures, and some may involve wholesale 
assignment of future innovation. 
¶39 We did find one fascinating example of the wholesale assignment of innovation with an 
institution in a developing nation and have heard that this may represent a pattern. Specifically, we 
found a summary of an agreement with Brazil’s Campinas University, one of that country’s largest 
academic institutions. In that agreement, Intellectual Ventures appears to have secured the rights to 
file Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) patent applications for inventions developed at the university. 
In other words, the university may file domestic patent applications in its own country, and then 
Intellectual Ventures has the right to file PCT applications and secure worldwide rights to the 
inventions. The agreement appears to provide some revenue-share potential with the university as 
the result of Intellectual Ventures’ commercialization, although we were not able to determine the 
specific terms and conditions. 
¶40 We have been told that similar deals exist with universities in other developing countries. It is 
certainly a forward-looking approach towards gathering rights to future innovation, but it is one that 
could backfire on the company. Suppose, for example, that some individuals at academic institutions 
become unhappy with the deal and respond by creating very little that would fall within the terms of 
the agreement for the period of the agreement or by simply devoting their efforts to non-patentable 
activities. That would be a bad result on all levels—for the academic institution, for Intellectual 
Ventures, and for innovation as a whole. 
2. Acquisition Through Portfolio Assumption 
¶41 Another source of patents for Intellectual Ventures comes from offering a turnkey licensing 
service for small-to-medium enterprises. Consider, for example, the deal that Intellectual Ventures 
completed with the Digimarc Corporation in 2010. According to Digimarc’s SEC filings, the 
company has granted Intellectual Ventures an exclusive license with the right to sublicense almost all 
of Digimarc’s patents.35 
¶42 The broad terms of Digimarc’s deal with IV are as follows: 
 
• a license issue fee of $36 million, paid in increasing quarterly installments over three 
years;  
• 20% of the profits generated from the IV’s licensing program, less expenses that include 
the license issue fee above;  
• IV assumes responsibility for approximately $1 million per year in prosecution and 
maintenance costs previously borne by Digimarc for the licensed patents;  
• a minimum of $4 million of paid support over five years from Digimarc to assist IV in 
licensing-related efforts; and  
• a royalty-free grant-back license to the licensed patents to continue Digimarc’s existing 
business related to those assets.  
 
¶43 Thus, Intellectual Ventures buys the rights to most of Digimarc’s patents, assumes the costs of 
maintaining the portfolio, and gains the right to go after other companies. Digimarc gets a cash 
payment plus a percentage of income earned when Intellectual Ventures goes after other companies 
                                                
35 The deal includes 597 patents and 288 patent applications owned by Digimarc. The company has retained 4 patents and 
128 patent applications, as well as 26 patents and 26 patent applications for which it holds rights with third parties. 
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with the portfolio. Digimarc also retains a license to use the patents, as long as the use relates to its 
existing business. 
C. Funding Sources 
¶44 To finance its acquisitions and operations, Intellectual Ventures has raised at least $5 billion, 
according to published reports.36 The company’s initial funding seems to have come from operating 
companies such as Microsoft, Intel, Sony, Nokia, Apple, Google, and eBay. Subsequent funding 
sources include financial investors, comprised heavily of institutional endowments and wealthy 
individuals. These include the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the University of Pennsylvania, 
the University of Notre Dame, Grinnell College, and Charles River Ventures. The Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation has asked Intellectual Ventures to perform some contract research related to 
antimalarial devices; as far as we can tell, this is the only physical product made by the company, 
apart from some prototype work in a nuclear reactor co-invented by Myhrvold.37 
¶45 Intellectual Ventures’ investments are distributed among more than five funds, and the investors 
have not necessarily invested in each fund or in each fund equally.38 In litigation against Xilinx in May 
2011, Intellectual Ventures was forced to disclose the investors for four of its funds. In addition to 
the initial funding group mentioned above, investors included Amazon.com, American Express, 
Adobe, Cisco, Verizon, and Yahoo!, as well as Xilinx itself.39 
¶46 According to Myhrvold, the funds raised by Intellectual Ventures are in the form of capital 
commitments that the company can use over a certain time period. The company claims that it has 
been structured to operate in a manner resembling that of venture capital and private equity funds. 
Thus, the company strives to receive approximately a 2% management fee plus 20% on the carried 
interest,40 although actual terms from may vary significantly from fund to fund and acquisition to 
acquisition. 
D. Return on Investment 
¶47 One of the most interesting questions about mass aggregators, and one that is difficult to 
generalize, is what do investors get in return? The investors vary tremendously, as do the types of 
deals they are likely to have made. Some investors appear to be interested both in financial returns 
and in access to Intellectual Ventures’ vast pool of patents.41 As Vincent Pluvinage, Intellectual 
Ventures’ former head of acquisitions, once explained, for investors that are technology companies, 
Intellectual Ventures can provide a defensive function in the form of access to patent licenses.42 
Pluvinage has stated, in fact, that some technology company investors have indicated specific 
                                                
36 Investing in Invention, INTELLECTUAL VENTURES, http://intellectualventures.com/WhoWeAre.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 
2011); Defendants’ Certificate of Interested Entities or Persons Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 3-16 and FRCP 7.1, Xilinx, Inc. v. 
Invention Investment Fund 1 LP, No. 11-CV-0671-SI (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2011). 
37 The Need for Innovation in Energy, INTELLECTUAL VENTURES, 
http://intellectualventures.com/OurInventions/TerraPower.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2011); John Letzing, Myhrvold’s Patent Firm 
Sees Revenue Swell, MARKETWATCH (Mar. 4, 2011, 1:58 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/myhrvolds-patent-firm-sees-
revenue-swell-2011-03-04. 
38 These funds include: the Invention Science Fund I LLC; the Invention Science Inventors Fund I, LLC; Invention Science 
Management Fund I, LLC; the Invention Development Fund I LLC; the Invention Investment Fund I LP, the Invention 
Investment Fund II LLC, the Intellectual Ventures Fund I, and the Intellectual Ventures Fund II. 
39 The full list of investors in the four funds is listed at Appendix B.  
40 Page, supra note 22, at 10. 
41 For example, Verizon paid $350 million for patent licenses and an equity stake in one of Intellectual Ventures’ investment 
funds in July 2008, according to published reports. See, e.g., Law.com - Verizon Patent Case Marks a First for Intellectual Ventures, LEGAL 
TECHNOLOGY TODAY (Feb. 26, 2010), http://www.legaltechtoday.com/2010/02/26/law-com-verizon-patent-case-marks-a-first-
for-intellectual-ventures-2/. Intuit similarly struck a $120 million deal with Intellectual Ventures in early 2009.  See, e.g., Zusha 
Elinson, Intellectual Ventures and Intuit Work Out $120 Million Licensing Deal, Say Sources, THE RECORDER (June 24, 2009), available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202431711930&slreturn=1.  
42 For a description of using patents as bargaining chips in infringement litigation, see infra text accompanying note 169. 
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technology areas where they would like Intellectual Ventures to acquire patent rights in order to 
obtain license rights.43 
¶48 Another category of investors, however, would have little interest in access to patents. For 
example, one would not expect the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation or the World Bank to be 
particularly interested in patent licenses. In fact, Pluvinage confirmed that the company has some 
purely financial investors, and financial investors typically have no need for patent licenses. Pluvinage 
believes that the financial investors have chosen Intellectual Ventures and the general category of 
intellectual property as an investment because it’s believed to be uncorrelated to other investment 
classes. 
¶49 For investors who get access to the patent pool, that access provides something far more 
sophisticated and complex than the patent licenses that would be necessary to produce a product.44 
Consider the story of Verizon, which paid $350 million for patent licenses and an equity stake in one 
of the Intellectual Ventures Funds in 2008. TiVo sued Verizon for infringement.45 Verizon purchased 
a patent from one of Intellectual Ventures’ shell companies, which was then put to work as a 
counterclaim in the TiVo suit46 in a program that Intellectual Ventures calls “IP for Defense.”47 
¶50 One can see a similar progression with Vlingo. Nuance Communications sued Vlingo for 
infringement. At the time of the lawsuit, Vlingo’s portfolio contained mostly pending applications.48 
With this type of portfolio, a company would have nothing available for countersuit. Vlingo didn’t 
buy just one patent, as Verizon did, it bought seven patents from Intellectual Ventures and used five 
of them to sue Nuance. Thus, with both Vlingo and Verizon, the company was able to purchase the 
patents needed for leverage in litigation, just at the time it was needed.49 
¶51 Such transactions would be even more interesting if the arrangements allowed the purchaser to 
sell the patent back to the aggregator at the conclusion of the litigation.50 This would resemble a 
leasing program, or perhaps a form of a patent library, in which those who invest in mass aggregators 
could obtain just the right patent needed at just the right moment, returning the patent when the 
need has passed. The purchaser might even be able to make a profit on the transaction, given that a 
litigation-tested patent is presumably more valuable than an untested patent. 
¶52 Access to a vast patent pool could be enormously valuable to a technology company, but one 
must be careful of the hand that feeds. When infringement litigation broke out between Intellectual 
                                                
43  Page, supra note 22, at 11 (quoting Pluvinage’s statement that financial investors invest in Intellectual Ventures because 
“it’s uncorrelated and long term.” For strategic investors, Intellectual Ventures offers a “defensive function,” including the ability 
to tell Intellectual Ventures “which technology domain they want access to”). 
44 We do not know if Intellectual Ventures’ licenses are perpetual or require recurring royalty payments. 
45 Tivo sued Verizon on August 26, 2009. TiVo Inc. v. Verizon Comm’cns, Inc., No. 2:09-CV-257, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
112320 (E.D. Tex. filed Aug. 26, 2009).   
46 The Intellectual Ventures shell was originally named Aerosound LLC before a recordation of its name change was made 
with the USPTO on February 17, 2010. See USPTO ASSIGNMENTS ON THE WEB, 
http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (search “Patent Number” for “5410344”). It is uncertain precisely when 
Verizon bought this patent, as the transaction has not been recorded at the USPTO; however, the counterclaim was added on 
February 24, 2010, and Verizon asserts that all rights in the ‘344 patent have been acquired by a wholly owned subsidiary named 
Services Corp. See Defendant’s Answer to First Amended Complaint and Counterclaims at 15, Tivo, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, 
Inc., No. 2:09-CV-257-DF (E.D. Tex. 2010). The USPTO assignment database shows no patents assigned to “Services Corp.” See 
USPTO ASSIGNMENTS ON THE WEB, http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (search “Assignee Name” for 
“Services Corp”). 
47 Value-Added Solutions & Services, INTELLECTUAL VENTURES, 
http://www.intven.com/ProductsServices/Licensing/ValueAddedProducts.aspx (last visited Dec. 5, 2011.). 
48 Vlingo also had two purchased patents, one from RPX and one from Nuance. 
49 Intellectual Ventures Moblcomm 1 LLC sold US Patent No. 5,680,388 to Apple, Inc. on March 7, 2011. The patent was 
originally owned by mobile telephony pioneer TeliaSonera. The patent, entitled “Method and Arrangement for Dynamic Allocation 
of Multiple Carrier-Wave Channels for Multiple Access by Frequency Division of Multiplexing” pertains to a level of 
telecommunications infrastructure not likely to have emerged from Apple’s own organic R&D programs. The patent does not yet 
appear to be involved in the emerging smartphone patent wars. See USPTO ASSIGNMENTS ON THE WEB, 
http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (search “Patent Number” for “5680388”).  
50 One Intellectual Ventures executive told one of the authors that the option to repurchase was a term of the Verizon deal, 
but we have not been able to independently verify this. 
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Ventures and Xilinx in 2011, it was interesting to note that Xilinx itself is listed as an Intellectual 
Ventures investor. 
¶53 Xilinx had filed a declaratory judgment suit against Intellectual Ventures after Intellectual 
Ventures sued three of Xilinx’ competitors. One cannot help but wonder what might have transpired 
between Intellectual Ventures and its investors that led the parties to litigation under these 
circumstances. No information is available, but one could imagine that the following might have 
happened. Perhaps Xilinx’s agreement with Intellectual Ventures includes that Xilinx purchases both 
an interest in the Intellectual Ventures investment fund and a license to use some of Intellectual 
Ventures’ patents on a true-up basis. If the license royalty is based on sales data from Xilinx, and 
Intellectual Ventures began to doubt that Xilinx was properly reporting its data or to dispute that 
data, one could see the infringement suits against Xilinx’s competitors as serving a dual purpose. The 
suits have the potential to both bring in settlement money from Xilinx’s competitors and to send a 
message to Xilinx that Intellectual Ventures has confidence in its patents and is serious about its 
demands. Under that scenario, the Xilinx suit, in which Xilinx asks the court to declare the 
Intellectual Ventures’ patent either invalid or not infringed by Xilinx, coupled with a Xilinx discovery 
request that has the effect of publicly revealing a list of the Intellectual Ventures investors, can be 
seen as Xilinx’s cannon shot reply. 
1. Capital Returns 
¶54 One of the most striking figures to consider is the amount of revenue Intellectual Ventures will 
need to generate if it is going to operate successfully in the venture capital model it has selected for 
itself, paying acceptable profits to its investors as well as its principals. In particular, Intellectual 
Ventures defines itself in comparison to venture capital and private equity firms. Venture Capital 
firms typically must provide profits to their investors that substantially exceed those of other 
investments in order to be considered successful. Venture capital funds tend to be extremely illiquid, 
with lifetimes of approximately 7-10 years during which the investor’s capital is often unavailable. 
This illiquidity is one justification for higher expected returns than the returns from more liquid 
investments. 
¶55 None of Intellectual Ventures’ network of companies is public, and Intellectual Ventures has not 
precisely distinguished publicly which part of its corporate network is the “VC firm/fund” part and 
which part is the “VC investment” part. The typical venture capital company invests in unrelated 
businesses whose origin does not trace back through to the general partners who created the 
investment fund. In the absence of an explanation, we will assume that the VC fund part comprises 
shell companies like the Invention Investment Fund I LP, and the VC investment part comprises 
patent-owning shell companies like Ferrara Ethereal LLC. We are also uncertain if any restrictions 
have been placed on the ability of the limited partners (the investors) in the VC fund portion to sell 
their shares to third parties. In the absence of being listed on a public exchange, even if these shares 
can be sold, they are less liquid than shares in public companies and may possibly have additional 
restrictions that render them even more illiquid. 
¶56 Myhrvold, Detkin, and other Intellectual Ventures executives have repeatedly described the 
company as a venture capital or private equity company operating in the intellectual property rights 
space. Given the comparison that Intellectual Ventures has chosen for itself, combined with the well-
heeled investors the company has drawn, and in consideration of the other investments these 
investors could have made instead, one could presume that the institutional investors assumed that 
Intellectual Ventures intends to pay them profits at least comparable to those of a successful venture 
capital or private equity firm. Some of the institutional investors may also have been intrigued with 
intellectual property rights as an asset class in a diversified portfolio. 
¶57 The minimum return, given the risk and illiquidity that investors in venture capital or private 
equity firms expect in the United States is approximately 20%, especially in the era preceding the 
financial crisis when many of Intellectual Ventures’ funds were raised.  In Intellectual Ventures’ case, 
this may well be a very conservative number. Investors often look for comparable investments in 
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determining risk. Acacia Research Corp., a public patent rights licensing company and therefore 
more liquid than a typical VC investment, probably provides the closest comparable to an investment 
in Intellectual Ventures. During the 2002-2007 time period, when many of Intellectual Ventures’ 
funds were likely being raised, Acacia’s shares grew more than 30% per year on average without any 
consideration of dividends paid by Acacia which would also be part of its value growth. Over the 
2002-2011 time period, Acacia’s shares grew by even more. All things being equal, one might expect 
that a rational investor would choose to make a more liquid and less risky investment in Acacia’s 
stock, than an illiquid and riskier investment in Intellectual Ventures—unless Intellectual Ventures 
had the promise of substantially greater returns. Nevertheless, we will use a conservative 20% return 
for our calculations of Intellectual Ventures’ minimum expected return to investors. Intellectual 
Ventures has said that of the money it makes from the investors’ capital, it intends to keep 20% of 
the profit for itself as carried interest and that it will also charge a 1-2% management fee calculated as 
a percentage of capital raised. We will use the figure 1.5% as an average management fee for 
simplicity. Therefore, the total expected minimum revenue needed to generate anticipated profits for 
the investors and Intellectual Ventures as well as paying the management fees would need to be a 
little over 25% per year. 
¶58 Although the length of investment is an unknown parameter, assume a 10-year investment 
lifetime, which is not uncommon in the venture capital world.51 Combining these parameters with $5 
billion in investment would yield a lifetime revenue expectation for all the funds of roughly $40 
billion to be considered a minimally successful investment. This calculation assumes that investors 
receive the profits at the end of the fund’s lifetime. If one assumes that the funds have lifetimes 
longer than 10 years, then the revenue expectations grow substantially larger. If, for example, 
Intellectual Ventures has pegged the revenue expectations at the 20-year lifetime of a patent, the 
lifetime expectation for the funds jumps to a minimum of $244 billion in order to generate the 
expected profits and cover management fees and capital costs. 
¶59 These calculations assume that all of Intellectual Ventures’ $5 billion in investment commitments 
have actually been received and invested by the company.  Intellectual Ventures has been somewhat 
coy about how much of the $5 billion it has actually received. If it receives just $1.5 billion from 
investors (a mere 30% of the reported commitments), then the 10-year revenue expectations still 
amount to $12 billion,52 an amount comparable to the amount that IBM will receive from intellectual 
property rights royalties over the same time period.53 
E. Collecting Revenue: Privateering & Other Exploits 
¶60 Intellectual Ventures claims to have collected approximately $2 billion in licensing fees so far, 
based on the company’s disclosures and recent licensing deals.54 Most large-scale IP licensing today 
exists only among very large technology companies, and this is consistent with Intellectual Ventures’ 
licensing efforts at this point. Myhrvold, however, told the Wall Street Journal in 2008, that the 
company ultimately plans to sign up hundreds or even thousands of companies as patent licensees. 
¶61 Intellectual Ventures has recently begun describing its services as bridging “the invention gap.” 
So, in a delightful metaphorical twist, the ugly troll under the bridge now works to help the goats 
over the stream (although the goats presumably still tender a cash award to the helpful troll). 
                                                
51  Venture capital firms generally require long-term investments in which the investor does not expect returns for 7-10 years. 
FAQ, NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL ASSOCIATION 
http://www.nvca.org/index.php?Itemid=147&id=119&option=com_content&view=article (last visited Nov. 15, 2011). There is a 
20% minimum venture capital fund return. See BASIL PETERS, EXIT STRATEGIES FOR ANGEL INVESTORS 19 (2009), 
http://www.basilpeters.com/Presentations/Exit_Strategies_for_Angel_Investors_20090415_Part_1.pdf.  
52 $1.5 billion would presumably be expected to generate $153 billion over a 20-year period. 
53 As a comparison, Intellectual Ventures has fewer than 800 employees; IBM has 427,000 employees.   
54 Intellectual Ventures’ Licensing Overview Data Sheet for July, 2011 indicates they have collected $2 billion in licensing 
revenue. Global Licensing Overview, INTELLECTUAL VENTURES, 
http://www.intellectualventures.com/Libraries/General/Licensing_Overview_Data_Sheet_July.sflb.ashx (last visited Nov. 15, 
2011). 
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¶62 Until recently, Intellectual Ventures used third parties to carry out much of its litigation activities. 
The technique is reminiscent of the historic practice known as privateering. Privateering was an 
extremely effective and troubling method of waging war, which was finally abolished by treaty in 
1856.55 It allowed governments to issue a “letter of marque and reprisal” to private parties, which 
allowed their ships to 1) capture any ships carrying the enemy’s flag, 2) sell the ship and cargo at 
auction, and 3) keep the proceeds. Privateering allowed governments to enlist private parties in their 
aggressive activities so that the country could wage war with no impact on the treasury. 
¶63 With Intellectual Ventures’ version of privateering, the company sells a patent to a more 
aggressive licensing company, retaining a license for the Intellectual Ventures investors. The new 
owner is free to sue or license anyone not covered by the previous owner. The approach allows 
Intellectual Ventures to profit indirectly from the litigation without engaging in the expenditures or 
the risks of litigation. 
¶64 Privateering could be a very effective way of nudging reluctant licensees in the following manner. 
An aggregator approaches a company, and demands that the company license one of the aggregator’s 
patents. When the company demurs, the aggregator sells the patent to an aggressive third party, who 
sues for a far higher license value. The aggregate then approaches the company again, this time 
demanding that the company license a different one of the aggregator’s patents. This time, the 
company may be much more compliant. 
¶65 The approach could also be used to prod one’s own licensees to toe the line, as speculated with 
the Xilinx circumstances above. Specifically, if the licensee must make payments to the aggregator 
based on the licensee’s sales volume, and the aggregator believes that the licensee is being less than 
candid, the aggregator could sponsor an aggressive action by one of its proxies against a competitor 
of the licensee as a way to demonstrate potential consequences to its recalcitrant licensee. This 
approach would be reminiscent of the old Chinese adage of “kill the chicken to frighten the 
monkey.” 
¶66 While we do not know the deal terms, we did, however, find many examples of Intellectual 
Ventures using third-party proxies to litigate infringement claims against companies who appear to 
be likely licensing targets for large portions of Intellectual Ventures’ portfolio. In particular, many of 
the patents sold by Intellectual Ventures have ended up in litigations brought by their new acquirers. 
Patents formerly owned by apparent Intellectual Ventures shells Viviana LLC,56 Gisel Assets KG 
LLC,57 Kwon Holdings Group LLC,58 SF IP Properties 24 LLC,59 Ferrara Ethereal LLC,60 and 
Mission Abstract Data LLC61 have been employed in patent infringement litigations respectively 
brought by the purchasers Picture Frame Innovations LLC,62 Patent Harbor LLC,63 Oasis Research 
                                                
55 One of the authors has previously discussed the similarity between historic privateering and the activities of modern non-
practicing entities. See generally Thomas L. Ewing, Indirect Exploitation of Intellectual Property Rights by Corporations and Investors: IP 
Privateering & Modern Letters of Marque & Reprisal, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. (forthcoming Winter 2011). The treaty abolishing 
privateering is the Declaration Respecting Maritime Law. Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, U.K.-France, April 16, 1856, 
available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/105?OpenDocument. 
56 See USPTO ASSIGNMENTS ON THE WEB, http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (search “Assignee Name” 
for “Viviana”).  
57 See USPTO ASSIGNMENTS ON THE WEB, http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (search “Assignee Name” 
for “Gisel Assets”).  
58 See USPTO ASSIGNMENTS ON THE WEB, http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (search “Assignee Name” 
for “Kwon Holdings”).  
59 See USPTO ASSIGNMENTS ON THE WEB, http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (search “Assignee Name” 
for “S.F. IP Properties 24”).  
60 See USPTO ASSIGNMENTS ON THE WEB, http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (search “Assignee Name” 
for “Ferrara Ethereal”).  
61 See USPTO ASSIGNMENTS ON THE WEB, http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (search “Assignee Name” 
for “Mission Abstract”), and subsequent assignment from Intellectual Ventures Audio Data LLC. Intellectual Ventures also 
continues to sell patents, such as the recent sale from Intellectual Ventures’ Sinon Data LLC to Personal Voice Freedom LLC, a 
company apparently associated with Charles Eldering’s Technology, Patents, and Licensing Inc. 
62 See, e.g., Picture Frame Innovations, LLC v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. 1:2009-CV-04888 (N.D. Ill. filed Aug. 10, 2009). 
(Intellectual Ventures generally denies publicly having any involvement in this litigation. Nevertheless, we note that in the litigation, 
Kodak argued that Picture Frame lacked the right to sue, given rights in the patent retained by Viviana and/or Intellectual 
Ventures. Kodak’s counsel termed the Picture Frame’s agreement “a hunting license” in motions filed before the court. The case 
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LLC,64 InMotion Imagery Technologies, LLC,65 Webvention LLC,66 and Mission Abstract Data 
LLC.67 These litigations have been brought against companies such as Kodak, Hewlett Packard, 
Samsung and CBS Radio. Don Merino, senior vice president of licensing at Intellectual Ventures has 
said the sales were a logical step for the company and essentially denied that they related to 
privateering.68 “I have enough of a set of assets where it just makes sense to start turning inventory,” 
he told Dow Jones in a 2010 interview.69 Selling expiring assets makes perfect business sense, of 
course.  Nevertheless, the technique could be used, both to maximize aggressive litigation returns 
while attempting to stay at arm’s length, as well as reinforcing the message to one’s own license 
targets that cooperation is the better strategy.70 In addition, when the extent of the patent portfolio is 
unclear, the technique could be used to hint to targets that the patent being offered for licensing is 
only one piece of a more extensive portfolio in that area. 
¶67 In another example of using third parties for infringement litigation, Avistar Communications 
sold a group of 41 patents and applications to Intellectual Ventures Fund 61 in December of 2009 
for $11 million.71 In June of the following year, Intellectual Ventures re-sold these patents to 
Pragmatus.72 Five months later, Pragmatus used three of these patents to sue Facebook, YouTube, 
LinkedIn, and PhotoBucket.com for patent infringement. 
¶68 Pragmatus has also filed infringement lawsuits against the major United States cable companies, 
including Time Warner Cable, Cox Cable, Charter Communications, and Comcast, for infringement 
of two additional patents that were acquired from Intellectual Ventures prior to that lawsuit.73 An 
Intellectual Ventures shell company had acquired these patents in 2007 as part of a larger patent lot 
purchased at an Ocean Tomo patent auction for $3.025 million.74 While Intellectual Ventures 
probably does not own Pragmatus, it is not presently clear if Intellectual Ventures sold the patents 
for a lump sum cash payment or whether it is entitled to receive a percentage of the 
commercialization profits, including patent infringement damage awards and settlements. Deal terms 
comprising an upfront cash payment plus a revenue share seem fairly common in the patent 
marketplace generally.75 
¶69 The activities described above are only some examples of Intellectual Ventures’ transfers to third 
parties for the purpose of intellectual property rights exploitation through litigation and/or licensing 
that we came across.76 We suspect there may be many more examples. 
                                                                                                                                            
settled in January of 2011 without rulings on Kodak’s motions, and the terms of the settlement have not been made public.) 
63 See, e.g., Patent Harbor, LLC v. LG Electronics, Inc., No. 6:2010-CV-00436 (E.D. Tex. filed Aug. 20, 2010). 
64 See, e.g., Oasis Research, LLC v. Adrive, LLC, No. 4:2010-CV-00435 (E.D. Tex. filed Aug. 30, 2010). 
65 See, e.g., InMotion Imagery Tech., LLC v. JVC Ams., Corp., No. 2:2010-CV-00474 (E.D. Tex. filed Nov. 10, 2010). 
66 See, e.g., Webvention LLC v. Adidas Am. Inc., No. 2:2010-CV-00410 (E.D. Tex. filed Oct. 5, 2010). 
67 See, e.g., Mission Abstract Data LLC v. Beasley Broad. Grp. Inc., No. 1:11-CV-00176-LPS (D. Del. filed Mar. 1, 2011). Note 
that a Rule 7.1 filing in Mission Abstract Data states that the sole owner of this plaintiff is Digimedia Holdings, LLC, a Delaware 
entity formed in January, 2011 just a few weeks prior to the assignment of patents from Intellectual Ventures Audio Data LLC. 
One could conclude that Mission Abstract Data has different owners now than it did prior to the transaction with Intellectual 
Ventures Audio Data LLC. Mission Abstract Data LLC was formed as a company in April, 2007. 
68 Stuart Weinberg, Intellectual Ventures Patent Divestitures Continue, DOW JONES NEWSWIRES, Feb. 24, 2010; see also Tom Ewing, 
Introducing the Patent Privateers, 45 INTELL. ASSET MGMT. 31, 36 (2011). 
69 Weinberg, supra note 68. 
70 While discussing the merits of litigation versus licensing, Peter Detkin said, “litigation is a highly inefficient way to do 
licensing. But let’s not lose sight that litigation is just licensing by other means.”  Blumberg & Sydell, supra note 5. 
71 According to Avistar’s SEC filings, the complete transaction involved 99 US and foreign patents and 26 pending 
applications worldwide. Avistar Commc’ns, Annual Report (Form 10-K), Exhibit 10.39 (Mar. 30, 2010). 
72 These are the only patents whose ownership has been recorded to Pragmatus. 
73 See USPTO ASSIGNMENTS ON THE WEB, http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (search “Patent Number” 
for “5581479” and “5636139”) (showing patent rights passing from Lot 20 to Intellectual Ventures to Pragmatus). 
74 See Highlights of Ocean Tomo Spring 2007 Intellectual Property Auction, WINSTON & STRAWN LLP (May 2007), 
http://www.winston.com/siteFiles/publications/Ocean_Tomo.pdf (disclosing that maximum lot price was $3.025 million); see also 
supra note 73. 
75 Peter Detkin said, “We sell for some amount of money up front, and we get some percentage of the royalty stream down 
the road that is generated from these assets.”  Blumberg & Sydell, supra note 5. 
76 See, e.g., InMotion Imagery Tech., LLC v. Notorious Prods., Inc., No. 2:2011-CV-00415 (E.D. Tex. filed Sept. 15, 2011); 
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¶70 After primarily using third parties to file infringement litigations, Intellectual Ventures began 
suing companies directly in December 2010. On a single day, Intellectual Ventures filed three large 
patent litigations: one against a group of software security companies, one against DRAM and flash 
memory manufacturers, and one against field programmable gate array (FPGA) manufacturers.77 The 
company has filed additional infringement suits against the parties in other jurisdictions including the 
International Trade Commission. 
F. Other Mass Aggregators & Interconnections 
¶71 Intellectual Ventures’ success in raising capital has led to the creation of a number of smaller 
versions of the company. We will discuss a few such organizations briefly. It is unclear whether and 
to what extent Intellectual Ventures has partnered with these companies, but there are a number of 
striking connections and interactions among them. It is possible that Intellectual Ventures maintains 
ties to such other organizations as a way of lowering its exposure for various deals. In addition, with 
the amount of capital at Intellectual Ventures’ disposal, it would make sense for the company to 
make some investments of its own. 
1. Acacia Research Corporation 
¶72 Acacia Research Corporation likely represents the first modern mass aggregator.  Acacia is the 
largest publicly traded patent-licensing company, and has executed more than 1,000 license 
agreements across 104 of technology licensing programs.78 The company’s operating subsidiaries (a 
suite of limited liability companies) own or control the rights to more than 180 patent portfolios.79 
These portfolios relate to technologies from consumer electronics to automotive technologies and 
from medical devices to security technologies. Acacia’s licensees include companies as diverse as 3M, 
Microsoft, Mitsubishi, Bloomberg, Nokia, and the Walt Disney Company.80 Acacia recently began a 
turnkey licensing program for operating companies whose operations now include licensing more 
than 40,000 patents owned by Renesas, the world’s third-largest semiconductor company.81 
¶73 Acacia has been among the most litigious of the non-practicing entities. According to one report, 
the company and its subsidiaries have been plaintiffs in 280 patent lawsuits and defendants 
(presumably from declaratory judgment actions) in still more litigations.82 Early Acacia licensing 
assertions related to a portfolio of patents relating to audio and video transmission and receiving 
systems, commonly known as audio-on-demand and video-on-demand. 
                                                                                                                                            
InMotion Imagery Tech., LLC v. LFP Video Group, LLC, No. 2:2011-CV-00261 (E.D. Tex. filed May 19, 2011); Patent Harbor, 
LLC v. Dreamworks Animation, Inc., No. 6:2011-CV-00229 (E.D. Tex. filed May 9, 2011); Patent Harbor, LLC v. Twentieth 
Century Fox Home Entm’t, LLC, No. 6:2010-CV-00607 (E.D. Tex. filed Nov. 16, 2010); Patent Harbor, LLC v. Audiovox Corp., 
No. 6:2010-CV-00361 (E.D. Tex. filed July 21, 2010); InMotion Imagery Tech., LLC v. Penthouse Digital Media Prods., Inc., No. 
2:2010-CV-00084 (E.D. Tex. filed Mar. 10, 2010). We have not checked all of Intellectual Ventures’ 11,000 US patents to see 
which ones have been sold to third parties, but we suspect that Intellectual Ventures has sold more patents than the ones identified 
here. 
77 Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Canon Inc., No. 1:2011-CV-00792 (D. Del. filed Sept. 9, 2011); Intellectual Ventures I LLC 
v. Altera Corp., No. 1:2010-CV-01065 (D. Del. filed Dec. 8, 2010); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Hynix Semiconductor Inc., No. 
1:2010-CV-01066 (D. Del. filed Dec. 8, 2010). 
78 See Acacia, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (June 30, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/934549/000093454911000016/actg10q063011.htm. 
79 Id. (noting that “Acacia’s only identifiable intangible assets at June 30, 2011 and December 31, 2010 are patents and patent 
rights. Patent-related accumulated amortization totaled $33,058,000 and $31,198,000 as of June 30, 2011 and December 31, 2010, 
respectively.”). 
80 Investment Profile, ACACIA RESEARCH CORP. (October 2011), 
http://www.acaciatechnologies.com/docs/AcaciaFactSheet.pdf ((last visited Nov. 15, 2011). 
81 Press Release, Renesas Electronics And Acacia Research Enter Into Strategic Patent Licensing Alliance (Aug. 24, 2010), 
available at http://www.renesas.com/press/news/2010/news20100824.jsp. (Renesas is an entity formed by the merging of the 
semiconductor businesses of three Japanese companies—Hitachi, Mitsubishi, and NEC.) 
82 Daniel P. McCurdy, Patent Trolls Erode the Foundation of the U.S. Patent System, SCIENCE PROGRESS (Jan. 12, 2009), 
http://scienceprogress.org/2009/01/patent-trolls-erode-patent-system/.  
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¶74 Acacia83 has been a public company for nearly 10 years, and counts among its investors 
household mutual fund managers like Oppenheimer Funds, Fidelity, and the Vanguard Group.84 The 
company’s stock has generally followed a steadily upward trend. From the beginnings of public trade 
in the ACTG stock on Dec. 17, 2002, the shares have risen from $1.85/share to $40.28/share by 
Sept. 27, 2011, representing a 36%/year rise over the 2002-2011 period.85 
¶75 Acacia, which began operations in 1993, initially had two branches, one branch that made 
products and another branch that licensed patent rights, initially to V-chip technology.86 Over time, 
the product-making side of the company, which produced a system for rapid creation of DNA and 
other compounds on a programmable semiconductor chip, has somewhat diminished in significance. 
¶76 In August 2010, a wholly owned subsidiary of Acacia became the general partner of the Acacia 
Intellectual Property Fund, L.P. (the “Acacia IP Fund”), which was formed in August 2010. The 
Acacia IP Fund is authorized to raise up to $250 million.87 The Acacia IP Fund aims to follow in the 
patent-licensing work that Acacia has pioneered. 
2. Transpacific IP Ltd. 
¶77 Transpacific IP Ltd. began operations in Taiwan in 2004 and has expanded to include offices in 
Hong Kong, Beijing, Tokyo and Singapore. Unlike the typical intellectual property aggregator, 
Transpacific seems to have kept a very low profile with a fairly nondescript website and only a few 
news stories about the company. 
¶78 Despite its low profile, the company has amassed a portfolio of more than 3,000 US patents and 
applications.88 The company has purchased these patents from Asian companies as well as US 
companies. It is possible that Transpacific and Intellectual Ventures conducted some sort of business 
arrangement with each other in late 2007 or early 2008, although the terms and the timing are 
unclear. During this time period, a number of Transpacific’s patents seem to have shifted to new 
intellectual property attorneys who also appear to represent Intellectual Ventures for patent 
prosecution matters. 
¶79 We initially found Transpacific while searching for Intellectual Ventures shell companies but 
concluded that Transpacific is probably not an Intellectual Ventures shell, given that it seems to have 
its own corporate identity. Transpacific’s corporate structure seems to resemble that of Intellectual 
Ventures but in miniature, including a number of shell companies of its own. 
¶80 Intellectual Ventures has purchased patents from Transpacific and its shells. For example, two of 
the patents Intellectual Ventures is using in its spate of direct infringement lawsuits filed at the end of 
2010 were purchased from Transpacific.89 The transaction was characterized as a merger in 
documents filed with the USPTO. 
¶81 We noted above that Transpacific and Intellectual Ventures often share the same patent counsel. 
The sharing is so close that in one instance, a patent practitioner mistakenly filed a power of attorney 
signed by a Transpacific representative in the prosecution file for a seemingly unrelated Intellectual 
                                                
83 Trading as ACTG on the NASDAQ exchange. 
84 See Shareholders Major ACTG Acacia Research Corporation Shareholders, MORNINGSTAR, 
http://investors.morningstar.com/ownership/shareholders-major.html?t=ACTG&region=USA&culture=en-us (click tab for 
“Institutions”). 
85 This rise does not include any dividends paid during this period. See Acacia Research (ACTG) from Dec. 16, 2002 to Sept. 
27, 2011, GOOGLE FINANCE, 
http://www.google.com/finance/historical?cid=681024&startdate=Jul%205%2C%202001&enddate=Oct%204%2C%202011&n
um=30&start=2220# (last visited Nov. 15, 2011). 
86 See, e.g., Acacia Technologies Licenses Digital Media Transmission Technology to NXTV, ACACIA RESEARCH (Jan. 2, 2004), 
http://www.acaciaresearch.com/pr/010204NXTV.pdf. 
87Acacia, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Nov. 1, 2010), available at http://biz.yahoo.com/e/101101/actg10-q.html. 
88 Plus an even greater number of non-US patents/applications. 
89 Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Altera Corp., No. 1:2010-CV-01065 (D. Del. filed Dec. 8, 2010); Intellectual Ventures I LLC 
v. Hynix Semiconductor Inc., No. 1:2010-CV-01066 (D. Del. filed Dec. 8, 2010); USPTO ASSIGNMENTS ON THE WEB, 
http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (search “Patent Number” for “6260087” and “5687325”) (showing 
Transpacific’s involvement in the assignment of these patents to Intellectual Ventures). 
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Ventures shell company, a mistake one would not expect to see with completely unrelated 
portfolios.90 
3. RPX 
¶82 John Amster founded RPX in September 2008. Just prior to founding the company, Mr. Amster 
was Intellectual Ventures’ general manager of strategic acquisitions and vice president of licensing. 
RPX’s business model is to buy potentially problematic trolling patents and then license those 
patents to its members. Thus, the company’s members can head off the problems of intellectual 
property infringement litigation for a fraction of the cost. The company has grown rapidly, with 
annual revenues now in excess of $65 million. RPX held its initial public stock offering in 2011. 
¶83 It is possible that some of Intellectual Ventures’ investors wanted to participate in an aggregator 
that overtly operated as a patent defense fund, and a fund limited more to areas directly related to its 
investors’ businesses and interests, and that RPX was formed to fill this market need. The patents 
that RPX acquires tend to be somewhat more along the lines of nuisance value patent than the 
patents that Intellectual Ventures acquires, and it is possible that the two companies may not often 
find themselves competing for the purchase of a given patent. At present, RPX has signed up 
approximately 65 technology companies, about half of which have either sold patents to Intellectual 
Ventures or have invested in Intellectual Ventures.91 
¶84 RPX has spent over $300 million acquiring patents and controls them via several funds, such as 
RPX-LV Acquisition LLC and RPX-NW Acquisition LLC. However, while RPX licenses or buys 
patents for its current members, it does not always retain rights to these patents and acknowledges 
that the patents could later be used by other potentially litigious owners to bring suits against 
companies that were not members of RPX at the time in which it engaged in those licenses.92 RPX 
subscribers apparently do not enjoy a perpetual license to patents owned by the firm until after a 
three-year licensing period, which may inhibit a member from leaving RPX as patents acquired inside 
the three-year window may become unlicensed.93 
4. Round Rock Research 
¶85 Round Rock Research, LLC holds a portfolio of more than 3,400 US patents. All of these 
patents were acquired from Micron Technology in December 2009 and collectively represent roughly 
20% of Micron’s total patent assets. The company was incorporated in Delaware nearly a year before 
it was publicly announced that John Desmarais, a prominent US patent litigator, would lead the 
company.94 It was also formed nearly a year before the 3,400 patents were transferred from Micron 
to Round Rock. 
                                                
90 The power of attorney filed for US Patent No. 7,427,742 on Sept. 2, 2010 is for Tang Sung Capital, a TransPacific IP shell, 
when the correct owner of the patent is Intellectual Ventures’ shell Buvane Holdings. A power of attorney for Buvane was filed in 
the case on Jan. 11, 2011. We note that nothing in the assignment history for the ‘742 patent indicates that it was ever owned by a 
TransPacific shell. In contrast, IV has done numerous transactions with Cypress Semiconductor, the patent’s previous owner. 
Thus, it would seem that the patent prosecutor was simply confused about which power of attorney paper to file, a mistake that 
does not often arise in completely unrelated portfolios. 
91 RPX Corp., Final Prospectus (Form 424B4) (Sep. 16, 2011). 
92 In other words, if I am a company and I am worried about a troublesome patent that could be used against me, RPX can 
buy the patent and transfer the patent to a troll reserving a license for all RPX investors. The troll is then free to go after non-RPX 
investors, presumably their competitors. According to RPX, “in nearly a third of our transactions, we acquire rights only for our 
clients, and we have already begun to sell patents. Those joining later may not get the full benefit of licensing to our broad 
portfolio that our earlier clients enjoy.” FAQs, RPX CORP., http://www.rpxcorp.com/index.cfm?pageid=23 (last visited Nov. 15, 
2011). 
93 See Order No. 40, Initial Determination Granting Joint Motion to Terminate Investigation as to Respondent Performance 
Designed Products LLC, 2011 WL 4438273 (U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 2011) (Inv. No. 337-TA-773) (Appendix A contains a 
redacted version of a template RPX license, and the language above is found in Section 2.1(c).); Order No. 11, Initial 
Determination Granting Joint Motion to Terminate Investigation as to Vivitek, 2011 WL 2677777 (U.S. Inter’l Trade Comm’n, 
2011) (Inv. No. 337-TA-773) (Appendix A contains another redacted version of a template RPX license, and the language above is 
also found in Section 2.1(c)). 
94 After hearing the definition of “privateer,” Desmarais conceded that he was one, adding, “I’ve been called worse things.” 
John Desmarais, Round Rock Research, Comment made during the privateering portion of a panel discussion entitled “The 
Developing NPE Market” at the Intellectual Property Business Congress in San Francisco (June 20, 2011). Just prior to this 
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¶86 Micron has not made a formal filing with the SEC regarding the large patent sale to Round Rock 
or issued a press release about it. Curiously, Micron’s annual disclosures to the SEC from 2007-2010 
report a consistent figure for the number of patents held by the company and show no drop in the 
number of patents owned. Nevertheless, in litigation filings, Round Rock says that it has no parent 
company and that no publicly held company owns 10% or more of its stock. This has raised 
questions as to who owns Round Rock and/or who financed the sale.95 
¶87 Desmarais is the only public face for Round Rock.96 One could estimate that the value of 3,400 
Micron patents probably approaches or exceeds a hefty fraction of $1 billion,97 which is seemingly a 
larger sum than even a successful patent litigator would likely be able to muster from his own 
resources. 
¶88 Suggesting a connection between Round Rock and Intellectual Ventures would be speculation, 
but we do note an interesting number of intersections between the people involved in each entity. 
For example, Desmarais is the litigator for the patent infringement lawsuit that Intellectual Ventures 
has filed against the field programmable gate array manufacturers. He is also the litigator for one of 
the Pragmatus cases filed using patents formerly owned by Intellectual Ventures, as well as the 
litigator for Oasis Research, a possible Intellectual Ventures privateering operation. Melissa 
Finocchio, Intellectual Ventures’ chief litigation counsel, was formerly the head of the litigation 
department at Micron. In addition, Samsung has reportedly signed separate licensing agreements in 
2010 with Round Rock, Micron Technology, and Intellectual Ventures.98 
II. POTENTIAL POSITIVE EFFECTS 
¶89 We will begin by examining the potential positive effects that mass aggregators could bring. 
What opportunities are presented or failures are remedied by their appearance in the market? What 
positive implications do these effects have for innovation or for individual players in the world of 
invention? 
A. The Forgotten Inventor 
¶90 In a perfect world, there might be no role for mass aggregators. An inventor, incentivized by the 
rewards available through the patent system, creates an invention bringing forth the idea for all to see 
and benefit from. The inventor either manufactures a product resulting from the invention or 
licenses the invention to others for manufacture. Those who want to enter a particular commercial 
space, thoroughly scour the record of patents granted to determine whether they must obtain rights 
from any patent holders. If rights are needed, the parties willingly negotiate a license and the product 
goes forward.  At the end of the day, inventors are rewarded for the innovations they bring to the 
field, and society benefits from the introduction of new products and ideas. 
¶91 The patent system, however, is far from perfect, and the pathway from invention to patent to 
product is unlikely to be so simple, direct, or focused on patent law. Ideas and information can 
permeate intellectual exchanges, particularly in fields where academic research plays an important 
                                                                                                                                            
comment, Desmarais and the other attendees had heard a discussion of privateering that included a Powerpoint slide that defined 
“privateering” as “The assertion of IPRs by an entity (the privateer), typically in the form of an NPE, against a target company for 
the direct benefit of the privateer and the consequential benefit of a sponsor company, where the consequential benefits exceed the 
direct benefits.” 
95 See, e.g., Round Rock Research v. HTC Corp., No. 1:10-CV-00840-UNA (D. Del. filed Oct. 10, 2010). 
96 Desmarais, supra note 94.  
97 The Nortel patent auction was completed on July 1, 2011 for $4.5 billion and comprised a comparable number of patents 
albeit in a different technical subject. Nortel Networks Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (July 1, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/72911/000119312511179790/d8k.htm. 
98 Round Rock is to some extent the successor to Keystone Technology Solutions, LLC. Keystone was closely tethered to 
Micron and may well have been wholly owned by Micron. Many of Round Rock’s patent assets began as Micron properties, were 
transferred to Keystone, transferred back to Micron, and then transferred to Round Rock. Keystone does not appear to have had 
any employees who were not also Micron employees.  
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role. Such ideas may skip lightly along a discussion pipeline, moving around unmoored from their 
intellectual property tethers. Producers may incorporate ideas unconsciously, failing to recognize that 
the inspiration or credit belongs to someone else. In another scenario, a producer develops the idea 
through independent creation often completely unaware that someone else was technically “first” 
with the idea but maybe not with the product. Numerous researchers and inventors may be working 
on similar issues at the same time, as they try to push through the barriers at the edge of a field. A 
great invention may fail (initially) as a commercial product because other, unrelated but nevertheless 
enabling technologies, are themselves too immature to support a successful commercial product. 
Later, when the enabling technologies mature, the later innovators may be completely unaware that 
someone else pioneered similar products but failed commercially.99 
¶92 In theory, the producer should be able to search for relevant patents and arrange necessary 
licensing, but in the real world, this description is no more than a convenient myth. Many patent 
attorneys actively counsel their clients not to look at issued patents for fear of their client being put 
on notice, which risks the beginnings of a damage calculation plus the possibility of additional 
damages due to willfulness;100 many corporations have adopted similar firm-wide directives. Limited 
resources at the Patent and Trademark Office sometimes thwart patent examiners from screening 
out bad patents and weak claims. With roughly 2 million active US patents,101 identifying all 
potentially relevant patents is tremendously challenging. Moreover, it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
know in advance how broadly a patent will be interpreted and whether a particular patent claim will 
be upheld.102 Much of this uncertainty stems from the fact that the metes and bounds of the patent, 
when enforced, are determined by the court through the process of claim construction, a process that 
is notoriously unpredictable.103 In a classic example of the problem, two recent litigations happening 
at the same time within the same district court produced different constructions of the same claim 
term.104 
¶93 Even when a producer has diligently acquired all the licenses that appear to be needed, a new 
party may appear. In a problem known as patent stacking, producers find themselves paying out 
ever-greater amounts of their revenue to a theoretically unlimited number of patent holders. There is 
no law, rule, or guideline that necessarily limits the aggregate number of intellectual property licenses 
for a product to a fixed percentage of revenue, and it is theoretically possible for the collective 
amount of royalties to exceed 100% of revenue.105 
¶94 In short, the patent system works just fine for generating patents but stumbles in rights 
licensing.106 Some producers take licenses from aggressive licensors whose patents may not be 
                                                
99 One example of this phenomenon played out in NTP v. RIM, 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
100 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2011) (“[T]he court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.”). 
101 According to the World Intellectual Property Organization, there were 1,930,631 active patents in the United States in 
2009. Statistics on Patents, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2011). 
102 John M. Golden, Construing Patent Claims According to Their “Interpretive Community”: A Call for an Attorney-Plus-Artisan 
Perspective, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 324-25 (2008); Amber H. Rovner, Canons of Patent Claim Construction, 873 PLI/PAT 85, 130 
(2006) (“If one thing is certain . . . it is that claim construction is inherently uncertain.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); ROBIN 
FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT RIGHTS (forthcoming 2012). 
103 For commentary on the uncertainty of claim construction, and thereby claim scope, see, e.g., Gretchen A. Bender, 
Uncertainty and Unpredictability in Patent Litigation: The Time is Ripe for a Consistent Claim Construction Methodology, 8 J.  INTELL. PROP. L. 
175, 203-07 (2001) (noting that the Federal Circuit changed lower courts’ claim interpretations in about 40% of cases between 1996 
and 2001, which indicates a large degree of uncertainty for inventors and practitioners); Matthew Sag & Kurt Rohde, Patent Reform 
and Differential Impact, 8 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 33-35 (2007) (noting that the Federal Circuit’s failure to adopt a consistent 
methodology for claim construction has created “significant doctrinal instability and confusion in the lower courts”); R. Polk 
Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L . REV. 1105, 
1161-63 (2004) (analyzing the Federal Circuit’s decisions involving claim interpretation from 1996 to 2002 and finding a pattern of 
panel-dependent outcomes, as well as variability in the choice of methods used in claim construction by individual judges). See also 
Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1168 (2008) (offering 
that, due to the formalist structure of patent law, all claims are infinite in scope).  
104 See Arlington Indus. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., 632 F.3d 1246, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
105 Eleven patent holders each entitled to 10% of gross revenue would amount to 110% of revenue.   
106 And may stumble even further in fulfilling its ultimate raison d’etre in society. 
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infringed while other producers play games to avoid licensing rights from parties whose patents 
probably are infringed. It’s a hard knock life for the small inventor and the forthright producer.107 
¶95 Even when the proper parties do identify each other, information gaps, valuation difficulties, and 
other transaction obstacles may prevent consummation of a deal. Plagued by boundless uncertainty, 
insufficient information, and high transaction costs, the true patent system looks nothing like the 
idealized version.108 Imagine a real property market where almost no comparable information is 
available. The sales price for the house next door is unavailable as is the sale price for the house two 
blocks away with an identical floor plan.109 
¶96 In this world of imperfections, mass aggregators may provide a market mechanism for the 
forgotten inventor whose innovations are in use every day but who remains uncompensated. By 
creating a market for monetization of patents, mass aggregators might make it possible for individual 
inventors to find others who have the capital and expertise to identify and pursue claims against 
those who are producing products that infringe. 
¶97 Compensating existing inventors does not increase the store of available products or necessarily 
fund further innovation. One could argue, nevertheless, that a market for patent monetization 
benefits innovation beyond simply providing cash for the patent holder. Inventors as a whole may be 
more likely to bring forth new inventions if the mechanisms for reward operate more effectively than 
the roulette wheel that inventors face today.110 
B. The Middleman 
¶98 In addition to the possibility of compensating forgotten inventors, one could argue that mass 
aggregators serve as a form of efficient middle man, a market intermediary who helps patents find 
their way to those who would exploit them to create new products.  Inventors may not have the 
capital, expertise, or other necessary capacity to manufacture products. One could see the market for 
patent monetization as a matching system moving patents to those with proper production capacity. 
¶99 Middleman systems do have some precedence in the world of innovation finance. Venture 
Capitalists have been known to set up incubators to help those with ideas bring them to fruition. The 
market for patent monetization could be another variant on the theme. One possibly stark difference, 
however, is that the patent aggregators work purely with patent legal rights and not with technology 
licenses. Similarly, they do not tend to push the direction of new creations but instead scoop up 
creations in areas of interest to them, which tend to be the “hot” technology areas of today and not 
the beneficial technologies of tomorrow. In short, there does not seem to be a technology aggregator 
who works to facilitate the spread of otherwise unknown information and know-how as opposed to 
spreading legal rights whose boundaries are set forth on publicly available websites and patent 
libraries. 
¶100 As described above, Intellectual Ventures, if not the other mass aggregators, does have a 
laboratory set up like an incubator.111 The problem with the notion of mass aggregators as middle 
men connecting innovators with production capital and capacity, is that for the most part, they do 
not seem operate that way. Very little mass aggregator activity appears to be of the middleman 
variety. Most activity seems to be focused on the interaction of existing patents with existing 
products. In short, the mass aggregators are not “technology push” in the sense of directing the 
                                                
107 CHARLES STROUSE & MARTIN CHARNIN, It’s a Hard Knock Life, on ANNIE (1977).  
108 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Quantum Patent Mechanics, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 29, 53 (2005); Joshua S. Gans, David 
H. H. Hsu & Scott Stern, The Impact of Uncertain Intellectual Property Rights on the Market for Ideas: Evidence from Patent Grant Delays, 54 
MGMT. SCI. 986-89 (2008), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/academics/searle/papers/Stern.pdf; Anne Kelley, 
Practicing in the Patent Marketplace, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 130 (2011).    
109 See, e.g., Nathan Myhrvold & Mark Lemley, How to Make a Patent Market, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 257 (2007). 
110 We will discuss the 26-year “time lag” of patent exploitation and “To Serve Man” below. 
111 The lab, however, is a mere 27,500 square feet and tends to do little more than contract applied research in anti-malarial 
devices for the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. Our Inventions, INTELLECTUAL VENTURES, 
http://www.intellectualventures.com/OurInventions.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2011). 
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spark of creation for tomorrow’s new products. Rather, their activities follow the pattern of scanning 
the horizon to pick out today’s hot technology areas and then finding and securing orphaned and 
non-aligned patents that can be used to extract a return from today’s products. 
¶101 In theory, a market for patent monetization could operate as a type of exchange, where buyers 
and sellers can meet with lower transaction costs. Exchange markets, however, do invite arbitration 
and speculation, which does not always have a stabilizing economic influence. The speculative effects 
are multiplied by the extreme information asymmetries in the intellectual property rights markets in 
which some parties have access to extensive market information and other parties have little more 
than a gut feel. For this and other reasons, exchange systems tend to have a fairly extensive degree of 
regulation and supervision. 
C. The Litigation Defense Fund 
¶102 The most likely positive role for mass aggregators may be as a Litigation Defense Fund. The 
patent world is characterized by extensive bargaining.112 Of particular relevance to the aggregator 
scenario, a company faced with an infringement claim may look at its own portfolio to see what 
patents can be asserted against the entity that is threatening them. In other words, suppose you sue 
me for patent infringement. If I have an extensive patent portfolio and can threaten to assert them 
against your products, you may be more willing to settle your infringement claim against me, or we 
may be able to work out a cross-licensing arrangement. I am much more vulnerable to infringement 
suits, both ones that are strong and ones that are weak, if I do not have appropriate patents to 
bargain with. 
¶103 Wouldn’t it be nice if one could find precisely the patent one needs at just the right moment? 
Mass aggregators seem to be organized to provide exactly that service.  Recall for example, the 
Verizon scenario described above, in which Verizon purchased patents from the Intellectual 
Ventures portfolio to assert against TiVo as a counterclaim in TiVo’s infringement litigation against 
Verizon.113 This is reminiscent of the Just-In-Time inventory strategy, in which materials are 
purchased and products are made only as they are actually needed to meet customer orders.114 
¶104 One can think of mass aggregators as allowing Just-In-Time patenting. When a company is sued 
for infringement or must enter into a negotiation to acquire rights from another entity, the company 
can shop for and acquire precisely the patents that could present a counter threat to the opposing 
party. When the litigation is complete, the patent can be returned. This type of strategy could ensure 
that a company has the comfortable freedom to operate vis-à-vis its competitors without worrying 
about patent suits that are the scourge of the modern patent world.115 
¶105 In addition to the Verizon example, several other companies have successfully used this tactic to 
mitigate lawsuits brought against them.116 Hewlett Packard, for example, filed an infringement suit 
against Acer in March 2007.117 Acer, a Taiwanese company, subsequently bought several patents 
from a Taiwanese research organization,118 and then asserted the patents in a countersuit against 
HP.119 The lawsuit was settled by mid-2008.120 
                                                
112 FELDMAN, supra note 102 (arguing that patents do not grant clear, definitive rights but rather serve as the beginning of the 
bargaining over the contours of those rights). 
113 See discussion at text accompanying supra note 46. 
114 Just in Time (JIT) Manufacturing and Inventory Control System, ACCOUNTING FOR MANAGEMENT, 
http://www.accountingformanagement.com/just_in_time.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).  
115 Renting patents will do little to discourage lawsuits by non-practicing entities, however. 
116 These examples are discussed in Ewing, supra note 68. 
117 Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Acer, Inc., No. 02-07-CV-103-CE, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25952, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2008). 
118 See USPTO ASSIGNMENTS ON THE WEB, http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (search “Patent Number” 
for “5977626”, “6188132”, “6788257”, “6280021”) (showing execution dates to Acer in September and July of 2007); What is 
ITRI?, INDUS. TECH. RESEARCH INST., http://www.itri.org.tw/eng/about/article.asp?RootNodeId=010&NodeId=0101 (last 
visited Dec. 5, 2011).  
119 Erica Ogg, Acer Sues HP Again Over Patents, CNET NEWS BLOG (Oct. 31, 2007, 3:40 PM PDT), 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9808687-7.html. 
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¶106 Similarly, Samsung defended itself in a patent infringement case by buying patents and then using 
them in a countersuit against Matsushita.121 Over the course of the litigation, Samsung also filed 
counterclaims related to patents that it had previously obtained from a German government 
agency.122 
¶107 It would be difficult to overestimate the value of having an effective response to the problem of 
modern patent litigation. It is tremendously challenging, if not impossible, to determine whether an 
asserted patent is valid and whether it applies to the product it is being asserted against. Patent 
litigation is lengthy and expensive, and it is tough to predict the outcome of any individual case. 
When a company is sued for infringement, the rational choice may be to pay the person bringing the 
claim, even if the claim is quite weak. If a settlement cannot be reached, a company must slog 
through years of exhausting litigation that can drain the company’s finances, distract the company’s 
executives, and generate negative publicity. The ability to acquire the perfect weapon, tailored to a 
particular patent litigation, just at the time it is needed would be of great value to modern companies. 
¶108 Mass aggregators may offer a secondary function that can also help with litigation woes. Just-in-
Time patenting will not necessarily help in fending off trolls. Trolls, by definition, are non-practicing 
entities. Thus, trolls do not have any products that might be vulnerable to threats from other patents. 
There may be complicated strategies, in which patents can be used through third parties to interfere 
with a particular troll’s activities, but in general, Just-in-Time patenting is not a troll solution. 
¶109 Mass aggregators, however, can impede activities by non-practicing entities in other ways. Large 
patent pools with vast capital resources can deal with trolls by sopping up their potential patent 
inventory when it appears on the market. In other words, an aggregator on behalf of its subscriber 
operating companies may compete with trolls by buying up patents that could possibly used against 
any of them if they appear in an open market. The companies still incur costs to respond to the troll 
problem, but it may be cheaper to buy patents then to buy off trolls, and it is certainly less distracting 
and aggravating for company executives. In addition, the anti-troll patent acquisition activity is 
outsourced to a third party—the mass aggregator—who may gain experience as a repeat player in the 
market for patent monetization, allowing the company to focus on its core activity of production.123 
¶110 Similarly, the aggregator may approach a non-practicing entity that has already sued or 
threatened to sue members of the aggregator’s anti-troll club and simply buy the patent and or secure 
licenses. This process may provide settlement for the operating company members at lower cost than 
they would spend litigating (and settling) individual lawsuits, although one could question whether it 
constitutes horizontal collusion by competitors. 
¶111 This process may also be good for the aggregator’s business. When the non-practicing entity has 
also sued companies who are not members of the aggregator, the aggregator may also purchase 
additional licenses or make other arrangements with the non-practicing entity that make “joining the 
club” attractive for the non-member operating companies. Of course, this process does not really 
break the non-practicing entity’s business model, and in some sense provides it with greater certainty 
of an ultimate deal, albeit possibly at a lower profit.124 
                                                                                                                                            
120 Press Release, Hewlett Packard, HP and Acer Settle Patent Litigation (June 8, 2008), available at 
http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/newsroom/press/2008/080608a.html. 
121 Brief of Plaintiff at 5, Matushita v. Samsung, No. 02-336, 2005 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 32374 (D.N.J. 2005); Eric 
Hellweg, SonicBlue’s Bankruptcy: Big Media Wins, CNN MONEY (Mar. 27, 2003), 
http://money.cnn.com/2003/03/27/technology/techinvestor/hellweg/index.htm; USPTO ASSIGNMENTS ON THE WEB, 
http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (search “Patent Number” for “5481693”) (showing transfer of the ‘693 
patent to Samsung from SonicBlue on Nov. 14, 2002). 
122 See USPTO ASSIGNMENTS ON THE WEB, http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (search “Patent Number” 
for “5181209”) (purchased from the German aerospace research center now known as Deutsches Zentrum für Luft-Und 
Raumfahrt E.V.). 
123 One philosophical conundrum with this strategy, however, is whether the mass aggregator expressly abandons the 
purchased patents, thus eliminating them forever as a threat to anyone, or whether the mass aggregator subsequently solves the 
“free rider” problem by “trolling” against non-aggregator subscribers using the purchased patents. In the first approach, the 
aggregator performs a community service at the expense of its subscribers and financial backers; in the second approach, the 
aggregator essentially becomes a troll itself.  
124 This may encourage the non-practicing entity to enter a “volume business” on a lower revenue per unit transacted basis, 
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¶112 This particular anti-troll approach also has a pleasant side effect. As the aggregator amasses 
patents, those patents can be used as a hammer to bash competitors who haven’t joined the club, and 
the income can be used to defray the costs of acquisition. 
¶113 Intellectual Ventures has taken a particularly forward-looking approach to the activity. By signing 
up universities, research labs, and inventors, Intellectual Ventures has optioned future patentable 
ideas prior to their conception. In other words, they are not just swatting the pesky mosquitos; they 
are actually draining the swamp. Of course, this analogy assumes that “the swamp,” also known as a 
“biologically diverse wetland,” is a bad thing that all parties agree should be drained, filled in, paved 
over, and forgotten. 
¶114 The value of this litigation defense and anti-troll activity may explain why some of the largest 
market incumbent technology companies are listed as early investors and participants in mass 
aggregators. These companies may find the possibility of a defense fund tantalizingly appealing, even 
if they would be more reluctant to join troll-like activity. In addition, the pressure of joining a mass 
aggregator becomes greater across time. As your fellow technology companies sign up, it becomes 
harder to resist, even if it falls outside of corporate policies or the goals to which one might 
otherwise aspire. Business is a form of communication, and market actors tend to replicate the 
behavior of others. 
¶115 If the model works well enough, it could become more than Just-In-Time patenting. Over time, 
a company may not have to do much more than rattle the defensive sword against a competitor. The 
largest market incumbents presumably have the greatest potential access to the Just-in-Time patents. 
When one has an insurmountable weapon, there is no need to use the weapon.125 In this context, as 
companies demonstrate that they have access to any sort of patent for use against any sort of 
company via access to a pool, the amount of producer v. producer patent litigation could potentially 
be reduced as prospective litigants contemplate the potential impact of a new, unknown weapon that 
the well-heeled market incumbent could assert against them by virtue of its platinum club card. Thus, 
participating in a patent mass aggregator becomes a form of insurance. One may never need it, but it 
is there if necessary. Like any doomsday device, however, it needs to be advertised and concretized 
with strategic demonstrations of its potential power.126 
¶116 Finally, in thinking about the troll activity that mass aggregators could potentially counter, one 
must be careful that the cure is not worse than the disease. As patent scholars Meurer and Bessen 
point out in their book, troll activity accounts for only a small part of the costs of the patent 
system.127 If the potential harms from this anti-troll approach are too great, the solution could be 
worse than the problem. We will turn to considering the potential harms from mass aggregation 
activity. 
III. POTENTIAL HARMS 
¶117 If the patent system worked efficiently, one might be able to anticipate and measure the types of 
positive effects described above. The patent world, however, is far from perfect. In fact the same 
market imperfections that fuel the trolling phenomenon are likely to prevent the market for patent 
monetization from offering the positive effects contemplated and to create harm instead. The aspects 
of the patent system that ensure high transaction costs, encourage nuisance litigation, and create 
                                                                                                                                            
e.g., mass production. 
125 But then again, maybe not. In the period immediately following the Second World War, the US government assumed that 
it could fight all future wars using nuclear weapons and consequently wouldn’t need nearly as many soldiers, sailors, and marines. 
The armed services competed fiercely over control of nuclear weapons because the government was considering eliminating at 
least one of them. But when the Korean War came along, the strategists soon realized that some wars would be fought on scales 
that would not justify the use of nuclear weapons, and consequently, conventional weapons became much more attractive again 
and each of the separate services thrived. 
126 See, e.g., DR. STRANGELOVE, OR: HOW I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND LOVE THE BOMB (Columbia Pictures 
1964). The problem with the Soviet “doomsday device” was that they had not told the Americans they had developed it. 
127 JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT 
INNOVATORS AT RISK 160 (2008). 
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incentives for inefficient behaviors will carry over to the new patent system with the addition of 
aggregators. 
¶118 The overarching problem is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to get a quick and inexpensive 
answer in a patent dispute. Given the difficulty of translating the abstract language of a patent from 
one context to another, the lack of predictability in patent decisions, and other uncertainties in patent 
law, it is difficult to tell whether a particular patent claim will be upheld and whether a particular 
product will be found to infringe a given claim.128 No matter what the trial court decides, litigants 
have fairly good chances that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit may find differently. The 
cost of finding an answer to the question is quite high in terms of both dollars and time. Patent 
litigation is lengthy and expensive, so the cost of testing whether a particular threat of infringement 
has merit will be high. The cost is so high, in fact, that testing a threat can easily exceed the cost of 
settlement, and parties may rationally choose to pay a complainant even when the claims seem quite 
weak. 
¶119 In calculating the potential costs of litigating an infringement claim, a company must also include 
the risk that damages will be assessed. Current doctrines on measuring damages from patent 
infringement can result in awards that have a devastating impact on a company. Suppose a company 
makes a complicated, multi-component product. If one component of the company’s product is 
found to infringe someone else’s patent, the damages may far exceed the value of that component to 
the overall product.129 The greatest risk from an infringement suit, however, is that the company’s 
product will be simply shut down. Although the Supreme Court recently ruled that patent holders are 
not automatically entitled to an injunction after proving that someone is infringing the patent, 
injunctions are still frequently granted.130 Having to shut down the entire product could be 
devastating, even if the product could eventually be reconfigured to avoid infringing. In short, the 
problem is not just the high costs of getting an answer but also the risks associated with getting an 
adverse answer. These are not bets that the typical commercial actor wants to accept, and who may 
therefore want to make the problem go away by settlement. 
¶120 Such tremendously high transaction costs have the effect of incentivizing suboptimal behavior 
from all actors. For example, patent holders have an incentive to assert marginal patents in the hopes 
of getting the company to settle for an amount less than it would cost the company to litigate. With 
insufficient validity and valuation information, some patent holders asserting valid patents that are 
being infringed may seek damages far in excess of the patent’s value. Conversely, operating 
companies have an incentive to utilize the power that comes from their ability to employ better legal 
counsel in these complex interactions, even when the operating companies suspect that they are 
infringing a valid patent. 
¶121 Even perfectly honest and diligent operating companies are caught in the maelstrom. With the 
millions of active patents on record, each of which may have dozens or even hundreds of claims, 
combined with the difficulty of knowing how they will be interpreted, it is impossible to know with 
certainty that one’s product will not infringe someone else’s patent claims. In this environment, 
lawyers may encourage company executives not to search, to avoid the greater damages available 
from willful infringement. In a similar vein, patent counsel will instruct inventors not to search 
extensively for prior art, because a patent applicant need only disclose prior art that the applicant 
knows about. 
¶122 In short, the patent system is plagued by a vast supply of patents, many of which may be quite 
weak. The present system for granting patents does not overtly consider the overall patent supply in 
                                                
128 For a discussion of the uncertainty of language and other uncertainties inherent in patent law, see FELDMAN, supra note 
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130 eBay v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006); see also Lily Lim & Sarah E. Craven, Injunctions Enjoined; Remedies 
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a given technical area in granting new patents.131 In addition, regardless of whether the patent is weak 
or strong, the range of each patent cannot be determined without a large investment of time and 
effort, and any pre-litigation predictions about the scope of a patent may prove incredibly wrong. 
¶123 Mass aggregation will not alter the high transaction costs of obtaining an answer within the 
system, the vast supply of patents, or the incentive structures of the parties involved. These 
characteristics will persist regardless of whether the patent holder is an original inventor, a traditional 
troll, or a mass aggregator. 
¶124 One can think of mass aggregation as the patent system on speed.132 More bargaining and 
swordplay will take place among a company producing products, its competitors, and non-practicing 
patent holders, but some of the parties involved in this gamesmanship will be larger and have more 
sophisticated weaponry. Trolling activity will occur, but it will be carried out more often and by larger 
trolling entities. Without changing the basic incentive structures of the patent system, mass 
aggregation will be no better than the current patent system at rewarding the deserving inventor and 
greasing the wheels of innovation while protecting diligent producing companies. One could even 
argue that the mass aggregation activities will act as a multiplier for the worst aspects of the present 
system—deserving but low capitalized patentees will be further marginalized while product 
companies are forced to license greater numbers of marginal patents. 
¶125 If mass aggregation were merely no better than the current system, one might not be too 
concerned over about its appearance. Unfortunately however, while mass aggregators are likely to 
create harms to innovation as a whole. 
A. A Tax on Production 
¶126 In our vastly imperfect patent system in which transaction costs are substantial, information is 
difficult to obtain and is asymmetrically distributed, and the cost of testing the validity of a patent 
may be quite high, mass aggregators will be able to extract value through patents regardless of the 
strength of the patents they are asserting. The value ultimately would have to come through 
payments from manufacturers of current products, and the process would serve as a tax on current 
products. 
¶127 Such a tax on current production may serve to decrease future production and/or operate as a 
cost passed on to consumers. When costs of production increase, potential manufacturers must 
factor that cost into the decision of whether to produce. As the price point for rational production 
rises, fewer products will cross the threshold at which it is worth introducing the product. 
¶128 From another perspective, the tax on production also could end up reducing R&D. Although 
tracing spending decisions in a single firm is complex, at a very simple level, a company that must 
spend more on current production costs will have less to spend on research and development of new 
products. Many companies have historically funded their R&D from the same source that pays the 
company’s licenses.133 
¶129 From either perspective, a tax on production is likely to have the effect of reducing genuine 
product innovation. Thus, the products and services that are being created with the introduction of 
the market for patent monetization may not be ones that society wishes to encourage. 
                                                
131 The technical distance between issued patent claims in crowded fields may be lessened, leading to patents with narrower 
claims, but the Patent Office has yet to declare that it is even “difficult” to obtain a new patent in any given area, and no one has 
demonstrated that new patents in crowded areas are impossible to obtain. The patent prosecution system essentially functions as a 
bargaining process between the Patent Office and its “customers,” the patent applicants.   
132 More than six years ago, at the very beginning of its massive patent acquisitions, Intellectual Ventures was described as “a 
troll on steroids.” Lisa Lerer, Going Once, LAW.COM CORPORATE COUNSEL (Nov. 1, 2005), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleFriendlyCC.jsp?id=900005439584.  
133 This has led to what is sometimes known as “the two-dollar swing.” For every royalty dollar exchanged between a 
company and a competitor, a two-dollar differential is created between them if inbound and outbound licensing fees are tied to 
R&D funding. 
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B. Opportunities for Anticompetitive Conduct 
¶130 Certain characteristics of the market for patent monetization make it an excellent vehicle for 
anticompetitive conduct. The market for patent monetization itself may never be truly competitive. 
For example, the market for patent monetization may have first mover advantages. As many scholars 
have noted, larger groupings of patents may be more useful than smaller groupings or individual 
patents.134 With mass aggregation, early players in the field may become large enough to ensure 
success before others enter the market, not because the early players are better at evaluating patents 
and choosing good ones, but because of their sheer size combined with tactics used to intimidate. 
This phenomenon could create entry barriers such that those who come later will never be able to 
compete on even terms.135 
¶131 Antitrust law established some time ago that being big is not bad, in and of itself. Certain tactics, 
however, are troubling when taken by those who have the power to hurt consumer welfare in a 
particular market by adversely affecting prices, quantities, qualities, or varieties of goods and services 
that are currently or potentially available.136 In other words, big is not bad; it is what you do with your 
girth that matters. If entry barriers do exist, early entrants into the mass aggregation game may have 
the girth and the tactics that would raise antitrust concerns. 
¶132 We note, as an initial point, that the extensive ties among the various mass aggregators should 
raise questions and concerns about horizontal collusion. The complexity and opaque nature of the 
corporate structures make it extremely difficult to track the interactions and connect the dots. 
¶133 For example, consider the scenario suggested above in which the mass aggregator negotiates a 
license from a troublesome troll on behalf of its members. Under certain circumstances, one might 
consider this to be an example of horizontal collusion in which competitor producing companies join 
together to force a lower price from a supplier. 
¶134 In the largely unregulated environment of this early market, there do seem to be opportunities 
for horizontal interactions that could raise questions about anticompetitive behavior. For example, 
one prospective investor in mass aggregators reported interesting interactions between two 
aggregators, Acacia and RPX.137 According to the investor, the two entities have a monthly call in 
which Acacia describes the producers they are in the process of targeting and the patents they will 
assert against the producers. Acacia then names a price for the patents in question, and RPX 
purchases the patents if it wishes. 
¶135 Most likely, the interactions constitute nothing more than innocent, periodic sales discussions. 
Under other circumstances, however, the interactions could constitute horizontal collusion. This 
emerging market environment is reminiscent of the Wild West, in which the early settlers created and 
enforced their own norms, and there was little scrutiny or law enforcement from sovereign entities. 
C. Raising Rivals’ Costs138 
¶136 The current market for patent monetization offers other opportunities for anticompetitive 
behavior. For example, wouldn’t it be nice if you could create a tax on production for your 
competitor while keeping your own costs low? The market for patent monetization may be a good 
vehicle for that. Characteristics such as entry barriers to keep new entrants out, the inability to 
quickly resolve issues of patent validity and application, as well as the extensive bargaining inherent in 
                                                
134 See Peter N. Detkin, Leveling the Patent Playing Field, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 636, 641 (2007). 
135 Patents are unique goods somewhat like fine art. It is for similar reasons that the Getty Museum announced early on that it 
would stick to acquisition in certain key areas and would provide grants and subsidies to other museums. Otherwise, the best art 
would always be acquired by the Getty given the size of its endowment. 
136 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2 (1995), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm.  
137 See email from investor on file with authors.  
138 Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 
YALE L.J. 209 (1986). 
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the patent system provide ample opportunities for using the market for patent monetization to raise 
rivals’ costs. A tax on production is even more troubling when administered through a market 
concentrated in the hands of a few actors. 
¶137 Consider the recent lament of Google’s chief legal officer, David Drummond. Google purchased 
a smartphone operating system called Android to compete with Apple’s iPhone and smartphone 
devices that use Microsoft’s Windows system. As sales of Android increased, Apple and Microsoft 
joined a coalition of companies to purchase a set of patents from recently acquired Novell. Apple 
and Microsoft then teamed up in a second coalition to purchase a large set of telecommunications 
patents at auction from recently bankrupt Nortel Networks. Drummond complained that the group 
entered the Nortel auction, sending the bidding far above expected value, in order to prevent Google 
from purchasing the patents and to assert those patents against makers of Google’s Android phone 
in an effort to raise the cost of the phone.139 As Drummond commented so colorfully, “Microsoft 
and Apple have always been at each other’s throats, so when they get in bed together you have to 
start wondering what’s going on.”140 
¶138 The Justice Department, expressing concerns over the competitive effects of the group’s 
purchase of the Novell patents, insisted on certain requirements, including that 1) Microsoft sell back 
the Novell patents and maintain only a license; and 2) all of the patents acquired must be available for 
open source licensing.141 These requirements are cold comfort to Google, which is still subject to 
efforts by members of the group to assert the Nortel patents acquired in various ways against makers 
of Android phones.142  Apparently as a response to the Nortel auction, Google purchased Motorola 
Mobility, a mobile telecom arm of Motorola, for $12.5 billion in August 2011.143 The acquisition 
gives Google access to some 17,000 patents owned by Motorola Mobility.144 
¶139 Concerns about the possibility of raising rivals’ costs are particularly troubling in light of the 
privateering behavior that is prominent for most of the mass aggregators. Tom Ewing has described 
extensively how privateering through third parties can be used to damage one’s competitors or 
advance one’s competitive position through a variety of techniques. These include privateering 
activities that bring patent lawsuits aimed at scaring off a competitor’s customers and suppliers; 
patent suits timed to lower the stock price before an initial public offering or a merger so that the 
potential investor buys the stock for less, and privateering activity in a particular nascent field, which 
is designed to distract young management and drive risk capital towards particular companies.145 If 
particular mass aggregators accumulate sufficient power, then those who are “in the gang” have a 
tremendously powerful club that could be used for anticompetitive activity. 
                                                
139See David Drummond, When Patents Attack Android, THE OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Aug. 4, 2011, 12:37 PM), 
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/08/when-patents-attack-android.html (describing Microsoft’s effort in demanding $15 in 
licensing fees per phone from various Android phone makers) (citing Miyoung Kim, Microsoft Wants Samsung to Pay Smartphone 
License: Report, THOMSON REUTERS (July 6, 2011, 6:24 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/06/us-samsung-microsoft-
idUSTRE7651DB20110706). 
140 Id. 
141 U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, CPTN Holdings LLC and Novell Inc. Change Deal in Order to Address Department of Justice’s Open Source 
Concerns, JUSTICE NEWS (Apr. 20, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/April/11-at-491.html. 
142 See, e.g., Kim, supra note 139; Josh Halliday & Charles Arthur, Microsoft Sues Motorola Over Android, GUARDIAN TECH. BLOG 
(Oct. 5, 2010, 7:21 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/oct/04/microsoft-motorola-android-patent-lawsuit. Of 
major concern is the fact that a large number of the Nortel patents are related to emerging industry standards for fourth-generation 
(4G) wireless technology. See, e.g., Jamie Sturgeon, Five Years that Changed Everything, FIN. POST (Aug. 20, 2011, 8:59 AM), 
http://business.financialpost.com/2011/08/20/five-years-that-changed-everything/. Not surprisingly, Google appears to be 
purchasing patents en masse themselves, recently acquiring a portfolio of more than 1000 patents from International Business 
Machines. See Amir Efrati, Google Buys IBM Patents, WALL ST. J. (July 29, 2011, 12:41 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904800304576475663046346104.html.   
143 See Press Release, Google to Acquire Motorola Mobility (Aug. 15, 2011), available at 
http://investor.google.com/releases/2011/0815.html.  
144 Victoria Slind-Flor, Google, Nokia, Easyjet, ‘Snakeman,’ Yahoo!, UMG: Intellectual Property, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 4, 2011, 4:01 
AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-04/google-nokia-easyjet-yahoo-umg-intellectual-property.html.  
145 See Ewing, supra note 55. 
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¶140 Society should be particularly concerned about privateering activity aimed at next-generation 
technologies that threaten to unseat an entrenched monopolist.146 If participants in mass aggregators 
are well-entrenched monopolists, for example, patent lawsuits could conceivably be used to burden 
next-generation technology or soften them up for easier purchase. Imagine if Microsoft had 
purchased Sergey Brin and Larry Page’s little search engine long before Google became a competitive 
threat. 
¶141 The purchase of the Novell and Nortel patents has focused attention on activities in the 
smartphone sector. In general, however, purchasing patents to assert against a competitor, either 
directly or through third-party proxies, in an effort to raise the competitor’s costs is a type of 
behavior that can be difficult to detect and even harder to deter. A targeted competitor could try to 
assert private antitrust claims or claims of patent misuse.147 Current doctrinal trends in both areas, 
however, make these claims difficult to pursue. The Federal Circuit is hostile to claims of patent 
misuse and rarely finds such claims to be valid.148 Antitrust claims are even more difficult to 
pursue.149 In general, one has a right to petition the government, even if the successful petition would 
have an anticompetitive impact, and the definition of government includes a petition to a court. 150 
There is an exception in which one can base an antitrust claim on court filings that constitute sham 
litigation. This requires a finding that from both an objective and subjective perspective, the claim 
filed was a sham.151 Given the uncertainties in patent interpretation, however, it is extremely difficult 
to establish that assertion of a patent against a product is a sham, particularly given the high burden 
of proof that some courts have required in sham litigation cases. In sum, it is tremendously difficult 
to succeed in a private antitrust claim.152 
¶142 Competition authorities, such as the Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Justice, and 
state antitrust agencies might choose to file antitrust claims. These tend to be slow moving processes, 
however, and these agencies would face the same hurdles as private antitrust claimants. By the time 
the competition authorities detect the behavior, and the courts understand it enough to make room 
in the doctrines, early movers may have reaped their rewards and moved on to other tactics. In short, 
the type of tactics available to mass aggregators, given characteristics of patents and the structure of 
the market for patent monetization may raise troubling concerns of anticompetitive effects. 
D. Other Troubling Market Behavior 
¶143 Although details of mass aggregator behaviors are difficult to come by or to confirm, one 
fascinating episode involving RPX gives a rare inside view of the types of tactics that mass 
aggregators have used. In January of 2011, the owner of a Russian technology company contacted 
the FBI to suggest that criminal charges be filed against RPX for allegedly engaging in extortion, mail 
                                                
146 See Robin C. Feldman, Defensive Leveraging in Antitrust, 87 GEORGETOWN L.J. 2079 (1999). 
147 Particular to smartphones, patents that are essential to communication standards have been subject to high antitrust 
scrutiny. Members of standards bodies are required to license their patents on Fair Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) 
terms. However, due to the massive number of patents held by different members and the effect of cross-licensing on license rates, 
it is nearly impossible to find similarly-situated licensees in order to determine whether offered license rates are anti-competitive.  
Qualcomm v. Broadcom, 501 F.3d 297 (3rd Cir. 2007), is a singular case finding an antitrust violation because the licensor had blatantly 
offered reduced license rates for standard-essential patents to customers.    
148 See, e.g., Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 399 (2003) (arguing the 
fundamental limitation of antitrust analysis to evaluate abusive licensing practices). The Federal Circuit most recently re-affirmed 
the strict limits of the patent misuse doctrine in Princo Corp. v. ITC. Princo Corp. v. ITC, 616 F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(“Recognizing the narrow scope of the doctrine, we have emphasized that the defense of patent misuse is not available to a 
presumptive infringer simply because a patentee engages in some kind of wrongful commercial conduct, even conduct that may 
have anticompetitive effects.”). 
149 FELDMAN, supra note 102, ch. 5.   
150 The Noerr-Pennington doctrine is rooted in the constitutional right to political speech and allows citizens to petition the 
government without feat of antitrust liability. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); E. R.R. Presidents 
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). 
151 Prof’l Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1993) (articulating the present standard for 
sham litigation). 
152 FELDMAN, supra note 102, ch. 5. 
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or wire fraud, and racketeering. The letter, signed by the CEO and Chief Intellectual Property 
Counsel of Kaspersky Labs was reproduced on the GameTime IP Blog on May 31, 2011. 
¶144 The letter described the following allegations. According to Mr. Kaspersky, a non-practicing 
entity named IPAT sued his company and 23 other companies for patent infringement. Eventually, 
22 of the companies signed confidential settlement agreements and were released from the suit, and 
eleven of those became members of RPX. 
¶145 According to the letter, Kaspersky’s company was approached by RPX as well in an email 
explaining that RPX had acquired the patents in the lawsuit and could release Kaspersky from the 
suit in exchange for a 3-year membership in RPX at a cost of $160,000 a year. With such a 
membership, Kaspersky Labs would be released from the suit and would have the benefit of not 
being sued in connection with any of the other RPX patents. 
¶146 Mr. Kaspersky says that in the three months following the initial contact, he received additional 
letters and emails from RPX, noting that other defendants in the suit had joined RPX and been 
released, that the deadline for joining would soon expire, and that if Kaspersky were to ever sue 
other members of RPX, RPX would make patents from its pool available to that member to defend 
or counterclaim against Kapersky. Finally, Mr. Kaspersky received an email from RPX explaining 
that even though RPX had pledged not to use its patents offensively, RPX could sell its patents to 
third parties to be used against non-RPX members. (In such a scenario, of course, the few holdout 
companies would become the only targets.) The message also suggested that companies who did not 
contribute financially to the settlement would harm their relationship with industry peers. 
¶147 As far as we have been able to determine, the FBI has taken no action in response to the 
Kaspersky letter. Nevertheless, it is not hard to understand how a foreign entity might interpret this 
type of patent interaction as extortion. The episode also highlights the need for better definition of 
what is legal and what is not in this arena. For example, when would behavior analogous to what is 
described in the Kaspersky letter cross the line into anticompetitive behavior? Could the facts ever be 
such that it would constitute an attempt to monopolize a market by organizing a cartel? In asking 
that question, what market should we be analyzing, the market for the product covered by the patent, 
the market for patents in this product arena, or the market for monetization of patents as a whole? 
¶148 In addition, when should the legal rules require disclosure of a relationship between parties, 
either for conflict of interest rules, corporate disclosures, antitrust, or agency purposes? What would 
constitute a sufficient relationship between the parties to require disclosure? For example, if a mass 
aggregator’s members include all but one player in a particular arena, and the mass aggregator 
transfers the patent to a third party giving the third party the right to sue only those who are not 
members of the mass aggregator, is the third party acting as an agent of the aggregator when it sues 
the only holdout? These are the types of questions that current law is ill equipped to handle. 
E. Odd Characteristics of the Inputs Supplying the Market 
¶149 In addition to harm from a tax on current production and opportunities for anticompetitive 
conduct, the new market for patent monetization has other characteristics that raise the specter of 
harm to innovation and innovation industries. Consider first the odd characteristics of the inputs that 
are supplying the market for patent monetization. 
¶150 One can think of mass aggregators as any other type of market producer. Aggregators have a 
product to sell, and they must purchase inputs to create the product.  In this case, the sole raw 
materials are patents and patent applications. 
¶151 Purchasing patents as raw inputs for something other than a manufactured product differs from 
the traditional assumptions about the role of patents in the economy.153 The primary role of patents 
as it has developed in the modern economy is to allow an inventor or the inventor’s licensee to have 
                                                
153 Of course, some historical inventors such as the Wright Brothers were primarily interested in licensing their patents rather 
than making products, but such inventors were outliers. 
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market space for bringing a new product to market from the invention by excluding others from 
making, using, or selling the invention.154 As described above, however, aggregators make almost no 
effort themselves to cross the divide from patent to product. 
¶152 Patents are also created or acquired for defensive purposes. Once a company secures patent 
rights to an invention, that company frequently tries to patent possible variants of the invention, to 
keep competitors from making a close substitute for the product.155 Patents also flow out of R&D 
activity as academic institutions or commercial R&D departments search for innovations, patent 
them, and then put them aside, hoping to find a licensee who will develop the product or to turn to 
them when the company is ready to pursue new products. 
¶153 Once inventions have been created and patented, they traditionally change hands for a limited set 
of reasons, most of them related to product development. Companies producing a product may 
acquire patents or license them to create what is known as “freedom to operate”, that is the ability to 
produce a product without concerns of infringement suits.156 Along these lines, patents may also be 
acquired to create a robust portfolio so that competitors who might be tempted to file an 
infringement claim will be deterred or rebuffed by the number of patents that the company can 
threaten in return. Companies also find themselves with a varied patent portfolio through mergers 
and acquisitions, which may bring patents that range far from the company’s core products. 
¶154 Thus, the patents that are now being acquired as inputs for mass aggregators traditionally have 
been created and exchanged for other reasons, if at all.157 Whether patented offensively or 
defensively, inventions have typically been created and acquired either in hopes of creating a 
commercial product or for reasons closely related to a commercial product. These inputs, very few of 
which would ever generate revenue, are now being monetized and traded independent of underlying 
products. 
¶155 In the words of the patent system, we are finding a “new use” for these old products as inputs 
for the mass aggregator product. The new use, however, is not necessarily a good use, from society’s 
perspective, although it might potentially generate huge returns for certain investors and early 
adopters. 
F. Odd Characteristics of the Aggregator Business 
¶156 Although there are many ways to conceptualize the product that mass aggregators offer, consider 
the following perspective: What is the mechanism by which mass aggregators expect to generate 
income to share with their investors? Some investors receive the benefit of being able to use the 
portfolio as a shield from infringement litigation, but not all investors need this particular benefit. 
Investors such as the William & Flora Hewlett Charitable Foundation and the World Bank, for 
example, are unlikely to worry much about patent infringement lawsuits. All investors, however, are 
promised a share of the profits from the mass aggregator’s core business. That business involves 
gaining a return by monetizing patents. 
¶157 In order to gain a direct return from monetizing patents, the return must be collected from 
revenues on existing manufactured products. Someone, someplace has to make something that is at 
least sort of like the patented invention. There is simply no other way to make a penny from a 
patent.158 In other words, the aggregator’s level of return depends on how successful it is at 
                                                
154 We note that we are describing the role of patents in the modern economy, rather than the description necessarily 
promulgated in judicial decisions. 
155 This is called “defensive patenting”, in which patent continuations (procedural revisions of patent applications) are used to 
create new claims for different variants. For a discussion of use of defensive patents as bargaining chips in cross-licensing, see 
William E. Kovacic, Intellectual Property Policy and Competition Policy, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 421 (2011). 
156 Analysis of freedom to operate is complicated by the sheer volume of issued patents as well as the possibility of 
overlapping rights, termed by Carl Shapiro as a “patent thicket.” See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent 
Pools and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOCATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119 (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner, & Scott Stern eds., 
2001).   
157 We note that small trolls prototyped the process of altering the uses of patents many years ago. 
158 A technology license and/or know how would be a different matter. 
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extracting value from existing products or products close to the production pipeline. In a world of 
perfect information (especially regarding valuation), low transaction costs, and a smoothly 
functioning patent system, one might have fewer concerns about any negative effects on the 
innovation system.  Aggregators would simply play the role of ensuring that the proper value is 
shared with the proper inventor, an activity that might well stimulate future innovation.159 
¶158 In the real world of patents, however, the picture is quite different. As described above, the 
system is not effectively structured to filter out or even retard weak or misapplied patents, and the 
costs and risks of litigating an infringement suit may far exceed the costs of paying off a claimant. 
Thus, the result of having a market for patent monetization is not simply that the forgotten inventor 
triumphs; patents are monetized regardless of whether they are strong or weak.160 
¶159 To put it bluntly, the successful aggregator is likely the one that frightens the greatest number of 
companies in the most terrifying way. In fact, a potentially successful approach might be to use a 
large number of patents of questionable value acquired cheaply and mixed in with a handful of 
strong ones.161 When the aggregator knocks on the door, manufacturers may capitulate simply 
because the aggregator is the biggest, baddest guy on the block.162 
¶160 This may not be the type of market that society wishes to encourage. At the very least, society 
might want to curtail certain behaviors, if not forbid them altogether. How can one do this, however, 
without causing even greater harms to the innovation system?  How does one water the garden so 
that only the beneficial plants grow while the weeds whither? 
G. Economic Stability 
¶161 Although the possibilities are more remote, one should also consider the potential negative 
effects for the broader economy. Patents are linked to innovation in general, which is likely to affect 
all sectors. Thus, the effects of the market for patent monetization could be felt broadly across the 
economy. 
¶162 One reference point could be the dot.com crash of the early 2000s, which had a negative impact 
on the economy as a whole.163 The run-up to the dot.com crash featured large amounts of capital 
flowing into early stage and speculative technology companies, mostly related to the Internet. Many 
of the companies had yet to develop a product or to turn a profit; this was the era of “vaporware,” in 
which companies could receive funding, go public, and sell products on little more than the promise 
of what they might be able to develop. Everyone agreed that some companies would surely strike it 
rich in the Internet game, and investors were willing to bid up prices on shares of entities with little 
proven value in the hopes that some of them would prove to be gold. The “irrational exuberance” 
that drove investment to a frenzied level eventually burst, creating a recession in the technology 
industry with ripple effects across the broader economy.164 
                                                
159 Although even in a perfect system, one would presumably want to balance the royalties that are going to old technology 
(up to 26 years old) as opposed to rewards/royalties going to newer technologies. Most new patents expire 20 years, more or less, 
after their filing, but damages can be collected up to six years after infringement has occurred. 
160 Indeed, one of the benefits of the aggregator model is that it achieves the scale of the licensing operations of the large 
operating companies, such as IBM, where at least a few patents from a portfolio of 30,000 active patents is almost certain to be at 
least arguably infringed by any licensing target—and there are few reasons why the prospective licensee should review the 30,000 
active patents and develop strategies for arguing invalidity and/or non-infringement—which is precisely the game played by 
operating companies when approached by a small portfolio comprising just a few patents. 
161 This approach, of course, arguably mimics the approach target for a generation by the large operating companies in 
conducting their licensing operations. This is precisely the reason behind legendary licensing procedures such as the ruler metric in 
which each side literally measures its stack of patents against the other side’s stack. 
162 A process frequently described at IP symposiums as “a value proposition.” 
163 Roger Lowenstein thoroughly examines the fervor that led to the crash in ROGER LOWENSTEIN, ORIGINS OF THE 
CRASH: THE GREAT BUBBLE AND IT’S UNDOING, (Penguin 2004). Discussing the cavalier attitude of analysis and use of the rising 
market as a benchmark for investment, Lowenstein offers the following quote from Morgan Stanley’s Mary Meeker: “We have only 
one response to the word ‘valuation’ these days: ‘Bull Market.’” Id. at 111.   
164 This term, attributed to Alan Greenspan, is now used to describe a heightened state of speculative fervor. See Alan 
Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks at the Annual Dinner and Francis Boyer Lecture of the American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research: The Challenge of Central Banking in a Democratic Society (Dec. 5, 1996) (transcript available 
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¶163 Not all of the companies that failed during the technology crash were weaklings. Many of these 
companies had good business models, and the myriad of ways in which the Internet could be utilized 
offered legitimate opportunities for economic exploitation. Others have successfully resurrected the 
business models for certain companies that failed when the technology bubble burst in subsequent 
years. Nevertheless, the sector could not absorb all the capital that was being thrown at it 
indiscriminately, and this, among other problems, led to the crash. 
¶164 Although there are certainly differences between the emergence of the market for patent 
monetization and the run-up to the 2002 technology crash, the similarities are interesting. Most 
patents traditionally have proven to have little value. The promise of a new use for this intangible and 
abstract asset is already driving up prices for patents and could conceivably move prices above a 
rational level. This is particularly true given the venture capital like returns being promised to some 
investors, returns that are difficult to duplicate elsewhere in the current economy. One might 
reasonably wonder how much capital can be absorbed into the market for intellectual property rights 
over a period of time without the investment activity itself causing a local economic deformation. 
¶165 Specifically, if prices are driven to an irrationally high level, there could easily be a correction, one 
whose trajectory might be as steep as the run-up. With a sector crash, less aggressive aggregators 
could fail along with more aggressive ones, and publicly traded aggregators could fail along with the 
private ones. 
¶166 Normally, if some people are foolish enough to bid prices up to an irrational level, society would 
be unconcerned when those investments fail. We may care more, however, if the crash is such that it 
impacts the economy as a whole or impairs our ability to innovate in an economy largely based on 
innovation. By analogy, the government would allow Border’s Books to fail, for example, but would 
be more concerned with a threat of extensive bank failures. 
¶167 Although the chances of a wild patent ride followed by a broad economic crash are remote, the 
scenario is worth contemplating, nevertheless. To the extent that patents affect all sectors of the 
economy, one should be mindful of potentially destabilizing events. 
H. “To Serve Man”165  
¶168 Mass aggregator activity may have additional effects that will reduce or delay the benefits of 
innovation. In particular, the value proposition put to inventors from 400 universities worldwide and 
presumably a comparable number of independent inventors may have been something along the 
lines that this process would facilitate the commercial development of their inventions. But there is a 
stark difference between just patenting an invention and building a technical prototype, developing 
related know how, and creating a market for the invention. To obtain a patent one does not need to 
have a working product. Indeed, a genuinely working product could be years away. For example, 
Chester Carlson’s patented experiments with dry chemical photocopying machines from 1936 until 
he produced the first commercially successful Xerox machine in the early 1950s. His experience 
provides a cautionary example of the difference between a patent and working product.166 Funding 
an aggregator at best funds the Chester Carlsons of the world in 1936 and not the Haloid Xerox 
Company of the 1950s. Chester Carlson’s work on developing a photocopier would have likely 
stopped once an aggregator had purchased his first few patents.167 The aggregator would then wait 
for someone else to take up the ideas later—maybe as much as 26 years later—and then request 
                                                                                                                                            
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1996/19961205.htm).    
165 DAMON KNIGHT, TO SERVE MAN (1950). The short story was immortalized as a Twilight Zone episode in 1962. To Serve 
Man (The Twilight Zone), WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/To_Serve_Man_(The_Twilight_Zone) (last visited Dec. 5, 
2011).  
166 Carlson’s first patent, US Patent No. 2,221,776, claimed priority from an application filed in 1937. This initial patent was 
followed up by some 40 other patentable inventions over nearly a 35-year period by Carlson alone—apart from the additional 
inventive contributions made by Xerox employees working to elaborate Carlson’s initial inventive vision. 
167 And even if Carlson’s work continued, it would likely lack the practical groundings that come from placing products in the 
stream of commerce and then observing how to make them faster, cheaper, and better. 
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royalties. If Chester Carlson turned out to be the truly lone pioneer, then a practical photocopier 
would never have been produced, at least not on any sort of speedy timeframe. 
¶169 The situation of dropped inventions has already happened before. The fax machine, which was 
all the rage in the ‘80s and ‘90s was invented in 1881 but then largely dropped with the exception of 
improvements for the transmission of photographs by news agencies.168 Even if a Chester Carlson 
sells his first patent to an aggregator and continues working, his further work will not be guided by 
the real world fits and starts associated with making an early prototype and early commercial activity 
but will much more likely comprise a series of blue sky thought experiments disconnected from the 
real world. In short, the later patents will almost certainly be of lower value in this scenario because 
they build only on the shoulders of the first patent and not real experiences.169 
¶170 It is possible, of course, that buying up all the early Chester Carlson patents will encourage more 
Chester Carlson’s. For this to happen, however, Chester Carlson and many folks like him will have to 
believe that he got a good deal in selling his patents to the mass aggregator. While he might 
appreciate the cash that he was paid for the patents, Chester like many inventors, probably wants to 
see his technology developed. Society’s interests would parallel Chester’s in this regard. Innovations 
that are delayed or never produced can create little benefit for society as a whole, although such 
delays may possibly benefit incumbent producers since they can extend the lifetimes for what would 
otherwise be obsolete products. The imperfections of the patent system suggest that many of these 
patents would not have made it to market. Some percentage of those, however, would have stayed in 
someone’s drawer and had little effect on the innovation system at all, other than complicating patent 
searches. With mass aggregators, the products go into the drawer and the patents are used against 
current producers who might otherwise have continued on their way unimpeded. 
¶171 If the inventors who have sold to a modern mass aggregator had aspirations that the aggregator 
would facilitate the commercial exploitation of their inventions, they are likely to be sadly mistaken.  
The largest of the mass aggregators, Intellectual Ventures, has reportedly built only one prototype 
from all the inventions that it has purchased, and this one prototype was for an improved nuclear 
reactor that was co-invented by the company’s founder Nathan Myhrvold.170 
¶172 Thus, while aggregators may defend their activities on the grounds that they are promoting 
innovation and the great rewards that society will receive through new products, the reality may be 
that many fewer inventions ever become products and many more will be placed on a greatly 
extended trajectory. For inventors who hope that that mass aggregators will turn their patents into 
real products and the world will finally appreciate their innovations, the scenario is somewhat 
reminiscent of an old Twilight zone episode entitled, “To Serve Man.” In the episode, friendly aliens 
arrive and offer humanity a panacea from all the woes that beset it. The aliens even take some lucky 
humans back to their home planet who are so happy that they never return. Only later does humanity 
discover that the aliens’ book “To Serve Man” is not a gospel of benevolent duty, but a cookbook. 
I. Ancillary Implications 
¶173 In addition to the economic concerns raised above, the accumulation of power may be troubling 
in light of the potential for mischief in ancillary avenues. For example, in March of 2011, a company 
called Mission Abstract Data LLC sued more than 100 radio industry defendants from different parts 
                                                
168 US Patent No. 2,292,387 to Hedy Lamarr and George Antheil, which reported the invention of spread spectrum 
communication and frequency hopping, had nearly expired as a patent before the US Navy began preliminary work in developing a 
prototype. Lamarr and Antheil never sought to create a company around their invention, and the inaction resembled that of a 
patent aggregator. This communications technique underlies all modern communications techniques, however. For full story, see 
FELDMAN, supra note 102. 
169 Carlson’s story is not all that different from other disruptive innovators, including but not limited to television pioneer 
Philo Farnsworth and the Wright Brothers. 
170  TerraPower “was formed from an effort initiated in 2007 by Nathan Myhrvold’s company Intellectual Ventures.” Who We 
Are, TERRAPOWER, http://www.terrapower.com/WhoWeAre.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2011). TerraPower has raised $35 million. 
Matthew L. Wald, Developer of Novel Reactor Wins $35 Million Infusion, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/15/business/energy-environment/15nuke.html. Compared to the $5 billion Intellectual 
Ventures has ready to invest, TerraPower’s $35 million is less than 1% of Intellectual Ventures’ total funding. 
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of the country for patent infringement.171 Intellectual Ventures previously owned the underlying 
patents, and the pathway from Intellectual Ventures to Mission Abstract Data’s present owner 
Digimedia Holdings LLC is unclear. Similarly, the New York Times Company filed a declaratory 
judgment action172 against Webvention, LLC, which obtained its patents by merger with Intellectual 
Ventures’ Ferrara Ethereal LLC in Nov. 2009.173 The New York Times lawsuit ended in less than a 
month after the Times obtained a covenant not to sue from Webvention on undisclosed terms.174 
Another set of patents formerly owned by an Intellectual Ventures shell company, and now owned 
by Patent Harbor LLC, have been used in infringement lawsuits brought against 39 entertainment 
companies, including DreamWorks Animation SKG, Inc.175 In a draft of our article posted on an 
academic works-in-progress website in September of 2011, we noted ironically that Myhrvold is a 
board member of lead defendant DreamWorks Animation SKG, Inc.176 Although the timing may be 
coincidental, Dreamworks was dismissed from the lawsuit, by a motion filed jointly by plaintiffs and 
defendants, shortly after the article was posted.177 The dismissal serves as a reminder that it is good to 
have friends in high places. 
¶174 Most of these litigations are in early stages and very little information is available. The action of 
suing a large number of media producers, however, sparked our imagination. We offer the following 
scenario as a hypothetical and note that there is no indication of such intent on the part of any of the 
companies. 
¶175 Imagine a mass aggregator that is unhappy with the press coverage it is receiving or would like to 
encourage media support for a particular issue. With this in mind, the mass aggregator sues a large 
number of players in a particular sector of the media based on patents that the aggregator has 
recently acquired. When the parties sit down to negotiate, the mass aggregator notes obliquely that, 
“it is so odd to be on opposite sides of the table when we have so many issues of mutual interest.”178 
The conversation could then touch lightly on coverage that would portray the mass aggregator in a 
better light or political initiatives that the media outlets might be interested in investigating or 
supporting. Across time as the parties work together on various issues, the settlement costs seem to 
move into a range that is remarkably comfortable for the media stations.179 
¶176 Players in the patent world are quite adept at oblique conversations. In many circumstances, a 
patent holder may wish to demand that a producer pay for a license without taking the risk that the 
producer will file a declaratory judgment action to have the patent invalidated. Declaratory Judgment 
actions can only be filed if there is a sufficient threat of litigation.180 To avoid crossing the threshold, 
                                                
171 The case names 116 defendants, although many may be corporately related to each other. See Mission Abstract Data LLC 
v. Beasley Broadcasting Group, Inc., No. 1:11-CV-00176-LPS, (D. Del. filed Mar. 1, 2011). 
172 N.Y. Times Co. v. Webvention Holdings LLC, No. 1:11-CV-00634-GMS (D. Del. filed July 18, 2011). 
173 See USPTO ASSIGNMENTS ON THE WEB, http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (search “Assignee Name” 
for “Ferrara Ethereal LLC”).  
174 See Notice Of Dismissal Without Prejudice Against Webvention, N.Y. Times Co. v. Webvention Holdings LLC, No. 1:11-
CV-00634-GMS (D. Del. Aug. 17, 2011). 
175 Patent Harbor, LLC v. DreamWorks Animation SKG, Inc., No. 6:2011-CV-00229-LED (E.D. Tex. filed May 9, 2011) 
(The complaint was filed on May 9, 2011, and involves two patents formerly owned by Gisel Assets KG, LLC, a company that 
appears to be an Intellectual Ventures shell company). 
176 Robin Feldman & Thomas Ewing, The Giants Among Us (unpublished manuscript) (Sept. 6, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1923449; see also DreamWorks Animation SKG, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Apr. 21, 2011), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1297401/000119312511110112/d8k.htm.  
177 See Stipulation By Patent Harbor, LLC, Paramount Home, Entertainment Inc., Dreamworks Animation, SKG, Inc., 
Dreamworks Animation, LLC, and Dreamworks Animation Home, Entertainment, LLC and Stipulation Of Dismissal Of 
Dreamworks, Animation, SKG, Inc., Dreamworks Animation, LLC, and Dreamworks Animation Home Entertainment , LLC, 
Patent Harbor, LLC v. DreamWorks Animation SKG, Inc., No. 6:2011-CV-00229-LED (E.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2011). 
178 This lawsuit ironically came to light about the same time that National Public Radio, not a party to the lawsuit, produced a 
program called “When Patents Attack” that was highly critical of Intellectual Ventures.  See Blumberg & Sydell, supra note 5.   
179 One could imagine an alternative scenario in which a new line of business as an “influence peddler.” An aggregator sues X 
number of media outlets for patent infringement. As a settlement, the aggregator then seeks some defined measure of editorial 
control. Having obtained a slice of editorial control over a huge swath of the media, the aggregator then sells this editorial control 
(or slices of it) to the highest bidder. 
180 See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (requiring “a substantial controversy, between parties 
having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment”) (quoting 
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patent holders may send correspondence referring to areas of mutual interest or issues that might be 
worth pursuing. This has been described as the Dance of the Sugar Plum Letter,181 and the media 
scenario above is simply a variation on the theme. 
¶177 The type of behavior suggested in the media hypothetical would be quite difficult to identify or 
to address. The hypothetical is a reminder that massive power can be troubling, not just for its 
potential economic effects, but for its potential effects in other dimensions as well. 
¶178 We note along these lines that since the draft of our article was posted,182 Intellectual Ventures 
purportedly has been wining and dining members of the academy. This approach may be familiar to 
the company, which appears to have solicited favorable commentary in the past.183 
IV. A FEW OBSERVATIONS 
¶179 The market for monetized patents, which has been created through patent aggregators, should 
be understood as a massive, rapidly growing, and essentially unregulated market. It has grown up 
quietly, remaining under the radar as early entrants have garnered power and strength. As with any 
market, it should be monitored and regulated, with sovereign entities giving some thought to whether 
aspects of the market should be encouraged, tolerated, deterred, or outright forbidden. 
A. Regulatory Oversight 
¶180 Competition authorities, such as the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice, 
are in the best position to address the activities of mass aggregators and the market for patent 
monetization. Establishing the rules for this market, however, will require a certain amount of 
reorientation in the conceptualization of innovation markets. 
¶181 The most natural FTC/DOJ regulatory structures for analyzing the activities of mass aggregators 
are those in the context of licensing and acquisition activity.184 In licensing, the Agencies follow a set 
of basic principles that are applied to intellectual property licensing in general. These principles are 
that intellectual property is comparable to any other form of property and standard antitrust analysis 
applies, that intellectual property is not presumed to create market power, and that intellectual 
property licensing is generally procompetitive.185 The Agencies believe that problems arise, however, 
when a licensing arrangement harms competition among entities that would have been actual or 
likely competitors in the absence of the arrangement. 
¶182 In analyzing intellectual property licensing agreements, the Agencies consider three basic markets 
that can be affected by anticompetitive licensing restrictions: goods markets, technology markets, and 
innovation markets. Goods markets, of course, are those related to final or intermediate goods and 
their close substitutes. When rights to intellectual property rights are marketed separately from the 
products in which they are used, the Agencies use technology markets to analyze competitive 
                                                                                                                                            
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)) . 
181 See FELDMAN, supra note 102, ch. 2. Intellectual Ventures use of the phrase “invention gaps” provides an excellent 
example of such communications. 
182 See Feldman, supra note 177.  
183 See Complaint and Jury Demand at 6, Choate v. Intellectual Ventures, LLC, No 1:11-CV-00528-ckk (D.C. Mar. 14, 2011) 
(alleging that plaintiff was hired by Intellectual Ventures to generate opposition to changes in patent law by disputing the theory 
that the patent system is in crisis due to frivolous litigation; activities included writing article and monograph). 
184 Three agency reports are particularly useful for understanding the current agency approach. U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION (2011), available at 
www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf [hereinafter EVOLVING MARKETPLACE]; U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE AND FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (2010), available at www.ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf [hereinafter 
MERGER GUIDELINES]; and U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE AND FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1995), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm [hereinafter 
ANTITRUST LICENSING]. 
185 See ANTITRUST LICENSING, supra note 184, at 2. 
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effects.186 Technology markets consist of the intellectual property that is licensed and its close 
substitutes. 
¶183 Finally, licensing arrangements may have competitive effects on innovation that cannot be 
adequately addressed through goods or technology markets. Thus, the Agencies have identified a 
third type of market, the innovation market, which is defined as the research and development 
directed to particular new or improved goods or processes.187 
¶184 The Agencies do have particular guidelines for certain types of arrangements that may be 
relevant to the activities of mass aggregators, including guidelines on cross-licensing, pooling 
arrangements, and grantbacks. Grantbacks are licensing arrangements in which the license holder 
agrees to give the patent holder rights to any improvements on the invention. 
¶185 In the case of pooling, for example, the guidelines note that exclusion from pooling 
arrangements can be anticompetitive if a) excluded firms cannot effectively compete in the relevant 
market and b) pool participants collectively poses market power in the relevant market.188 Similarly, 
grantbacks may be found anticompetitive if they substantially reduce the licensee’s incentives to 
engage in research and development.189 One should note, however, that these concerns are analyzed 
against a backdrop of the Agencies’ perspective that licensing is generally procompetitive. 
¶186 In a 2011 report on The Evolving Intellectual Property Marketplace, the Federal Trade 
Commission took notice of increasing activity by what it called “patent assertion entities” or “PAEs” 
in the information technology industry.190 In particular, the Agency noted the following: 
Some argue that PAEs encourage innovation by compensating inventors, but this argument 
ignores the fact that invention is only the first step in a long process of innovation.  Even if 
PAEs arguably encourage invention, they can deter innovation by raising costs and risks 
without making a technological contribution.191 
The report, however, notes the difficulty in distinguishing patent transactions that harm innovation 
from those that promote it, and rather than recommending antitrust action proposes various 
improvements in patent notice and remedies. 
¶187 Although these are important considerations, a full analysis of the impact of mass aggregators 
requires identification of a different market. Even when Agencies think about separately marketed 
intellectual property rights or innovation markets, those categories are grounded in their relationship 
to a particular product market. Moreover, market power is measured in relationship to that product 
market. 
¶188 When patent rights float unmoored from any underlying products on a large-scale, widespread 
manner such that they are traded and arbitraged, that activity begins to resemble a market of its own. 
This is the market we have been describing as the market for patent monetization. Viewed from this 
perspective, an entity could acquire market power in the market for patent monetization without 
necessarily holding a monopoly in any individual product markets.192 Considering only product, 
technology, and innovation markets could miss a fair amount of worrisome activity. 
¶189 Another way to think about floating patent rights and anticompetitive effects is the following: 
One may not need a monopoly on patents in a particular product market to create negative effects in 
that market. Perhaps one simply needs a large enough group of all kinds of patents in combination 
with tough tactics or even just a reputation for tough tactics. 
                                                
186 Id. at 8. 
187 Id. at 10-11. 
188 Id. at 28. 
189 Id. at 30. 
190 See EVOLVING MARKETPLACE, supra note 184, at 8. 
191 Id. at 9. 
192 See the discussion above about Intellectual Ventures and the Ocean Tomo patent auctions, for example. 
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¶190 Moreover, the Agencies may need to reconsider the general principle that licensing is 
procompetitive. In the context of a market for intellectual property rights floating separately from 
invention or production, that general principle may be less applicable. One has to take a much harder 
look at licensing when it has become such an expansive activity that is separated so far from the 
activity of introducing new technologies. 
¶191 The same types of considerations should be used for reorienting the Agencies’ approach to 
acquisition of intellectual property rights. Section 7 of the Clayton Act requires that certain proposed 
acquisitions of assets be reported, which is interpreted as including patents. The FTC and DOJ may 
conduct a preliminary antitrust evaluation and decide whether to take enforcement action.193 
¶192 Certain transfers of intellectual property rights and transaction that grant an exclusive license are 
analyzed by applying the principles and standards used to analyze mergers.194 Such transactions may 
have the effect of removing a participant from the market, in the same manner as a traditional 
merger would.195 
¶193 In any merger enforcement action, the Agencies will normally identify one or more relevant 
markets in which the merger may substantially lessen competition. Such market definitions focus 
solely on demand substitution factors, which are customers’ ability and willingness to substitute away 
from one product to another. Again, the traditional Agency focus in this inquiry would be on the 
market for the products that can be made by the patents that are being purchased, but not on the 
market for patent monetization itself. Such an inquiry would miss a wealth of potential 
anticompetitive conduct and consequences. 
¶194 In short, competition agencies should think about a market composed of floating intellectual 
property rights as its own market, in order to capture the potential for harm and mischief. Courts 
also must be willing to understand and approach patent markets in this manner. Although the focus 
initially may be on patents in this market, it is possible that over time it will become clear that the 
market for all intellectual property rights, including trade secrets and know-how as well as patents, 
should be considered. 
¶195 Courts, agencies and government entities must also engage in doctrinal changes that will allow 
for the curative power of sunshine. As we encountered in trying to track the acquisition and litigation 
activity of the mass aggregators, many of the current doctrines in corporation and agency law allow 
aggregators to shield their identities from government view and from their competitors who may be 
subsequently blindsided in litigation. The targets themselves may be unable to determine who the 
aggregator is, sometimes even when the parties are in litigation. The less appealing behavior 
described above is much easier to carry out in secrecy than in the light of day. We should consider 
changes that will bring such activities to light, making them easier to monitor and evaluate their 
individual and cumulative effects. 
B. Let the Sun Shine In 
¶196 If society wishes to impose regulation on the market for patent monetization, regulators will 
need a method of monitoring behavior. One might also wish to make activity transparent to 
members of the public, who can be useful for alerting regulators to potential problems. In particular, 
where the law anticipates that society’s interests may align with members of the public, lawmakers 
may choose to make information publicly available or to provide avenues for members of the public 
to advance actions on their own behalf. 
¶197 Current laws provide limited opportunities for identifying and tracking activity in this market and 
many opportunities for hiding. Mass aggregators have sufficient access to capital and legal resources 
to take advantage of all opportunities offered and to prepare for a host of contingencies. Among 
                                                
193 For a description of notice and filing requirements, see Premerger Introductory Guides, U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N (Oct. 24, 
2011), http://www.ftc.gov/bc/hsr/introguides/introguides.shtm. 
194 ANTITRUST LICENSING, supra note 184, at 31. 
195 Such transactions may be assessed under § 7 of the Clayton Act, §§ 1-2 of the Sherman Act, and § 5 of the FTC Act. 
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other things, the mass aggregators have constructed elaborate corporate networks that narrowly 
confine the legal claims that can be brought against them, providing a firewall that protects the larger 
organization. 
¶198 Consider Searete LLC, a fairly well-known Intellectual Ventures shell company196 that 
exemplifies the complicated ownership and management structures employed by mass aggregators.197 
Searete has the type of complex and carefully woven legal structure that would make a defense lawyer 
beam with joy. It is a Delaware limited liability company with a presence in Nevada.198 Searete’s 
official manager in Nevada is “Nevada Licensing Manager, LLC,” which is a Nevada corporation.199 
Nevada Licensing Manager’s own manager is “Nevada Assets, LLC,” which is a Delaware 
company.200 At some point, Nevada Assets, LLC presumably connects with Intellectual Ventures, 
LLC or one of Intellectual Ventures’ many investment funds. However, the connection might be 
little more than the ownership of shares, effectively rendering almost no one responsible for its 
actions.  
¶199 The other 1,300 or more shell companies in Intellectual Ventures’ organization exist in similarly 
obscure networks with the “parent” company, structures permitted by the corporate laws in many 
states. In short, the ownership and management structures for mass aggregators are often elaborate, 
and state corporation laws complicate the process of finding out who actually controls any given 
limited liability company.201 
¶200 The ownership and control picture may not become much clearer even after litigation has begun, 
not only for the public but for the litigants as well. Rule 7.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires all nongovernmental litigants to disclose their parent corporation and any publicly held 
corporation owning 10% or more of their stock.202 The rule’s purpose is not to discover litigation 
motives and corporate activities, but to assist judges in disqualifying themselves due to conflicts of 
interest.203 The rule’s focus on parents and public companies, however, limits its effectiveness in 
disclosing the parties ultimately behind patent monetization activity, especially with mass aggregators 
that are not public companies. 
¶201 Individual courts may impose additional disclosure rules that may bring further information to 
light. Some jurisdictions use variations of the rule. For example, the Central District of California 
employs the variation, known as a “Certification as to Interested Parties,” that requires disclosure of 
a much broader range of parties. The variation states: 
L.R. 7.1-1 Certification as to Interested Parties.1 To enable the Court to evaluate possible 
disqualification or recusal, counsel for all non-governmental parties shall file with their first 
appearance an original and two copies of a Notice of Interested Parties which shall list all 
persons, associations of persons, firms, partnerships and corporations (including parent 
corporations clearly identified as such) which may have a pecuniary interest in the outcome 
of the case, including any insurance carrier which may be liable in whole or in part (directly 
or indirectly) for a judgment that may be entered in the action or for the cost of defense. 
Counsel shall be under a continuing obligation to file an amended certification if any 
                                                
196 John Letzing, Microsoft’s Big Brains Spill Into Patent Firm, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 4, 2009) 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/microsofts-big-brains-spill-over-patent. 
197 Intellectual Ventures parks many of its “inventioneering” patent applications in Searete. Id. 
198 Delaware Corporations file 3776428 shows that Searete LLC was formed on March 12, 2004. DELAWARE DIVISION OF 
CORPORATIONS, https://delecorp.delaware.gov (search “file number” for “3776428”). Nevada Corporations records show that 
Searete LLC, Nevada Corporate Id NV20041267664 was registered in Nevada on Nov. 15, 2004. NEVADA BUSINESS ENTITY 
SEARCH, http://nvsos.gov/sosentitysearch/CorpSearch.aspx (search “NV Business ID” for “NV20041267664”). 
199 NEVADA BUSINESS ENTITY SEARCH, http://nvsos.gov/sosentitysearch/CorpSearch.aspx (search “NV Business ID” for 
“NV20041267664”). Nevada Corporation records show that Nevada Licensing Manager, Nevada Corporate ID NV20041268216 
was created on Nov. 15, 2004. Id. (search “NV Business ID” for “NV20041267664”). 
200 Delaware Corporations file 3881571 shows that Nevada Assets, LLC was also created on Nov. 15, 2004. DELAWARE 
DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS, https://delecorp.delaware.gov (search “file number” for “3881571”). 
201 Nevada, for example, is known for being particularly respectful of such information. Some, but far from all, foreign 
corporations laws are also protective of such information while other countries require full disclosure. 
202 FED. R. CIV. P. 7(a)(1).  
203 See GLEN WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE LITIGATION MANUAL 7.1.1 (Matthew Bender, 2010). 
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material change occurs in the status of interested parties as, for example, through merger or 
acquisition, or change in carrier which may be liable for any part of a judgment.204 
¶202 Some other courts use a similarly worded variation requiring that at a first appearance in any 
proceeding with the court, the party must file a “Certification of Interested Entities or Persons”: 
(1) The Certification must disclose any persons, associations of persons, firms, partnerships, 
corporations (including parent corporations), or other entities other than the parties 
themselves known by the party to have either: (i) a financial interest (of any kind) in the 
subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding; or (ii) any other kind of 
interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding. 
(2) For purposes of this Rule, the terms “proceeding” and “financial interest” shall have the 
meaning assigned by 28 U.S.C. 455 (d)(1), (3) and (4), respectively. 
(3) If a party has no disclosure to make pursuant to subparagraph (b)(1), that party must 
make a certification stating that no such interest is known other than that of the named 
parties to the action.205 
¶203 These additional disclosure rules of either variety have proven somewhat more effective in 
revealing the parties ultimately behind various Non-Practicing Entity patent litigations.  For example, 
Intellectual Ventures’ involvement in several cases was not initially disclosed under Rule 7.1 but was 
later disclosed under the local rule variations, including one case in which a major portion of its 
investors were disclosed.206 
¶204 For example, in Oasis Research, LLC v. Adrive, et al.207, the Rule 7.1 disclosure by Oasis Research 
stated that the company had no parent corporation and that no publicly held corporation owned 
10% or more of its stock.208 But seven months later in complying with a local rule similar to one of 
the variations above, Oasis Research disclosed that “Intellectual Ventures Computing Platforce 
Assets LLC” had a financial interest in the outcome of the case.209 Intellectual Ventures co-founder 
Peter Detkin later conceded during a radio interview that Intellectual Ventures Computing Platforce 
Assets, LLC was an Intellectual Ventures shell company.210 
¶205 Similarly, in Xilinx v. Invention Investment Fund I LP,211 the plaintiff Xilinx filed a declaratory 
judgment action in California against six Intellectual Ventures affiliated companies shortly after 
Intellectual Ventures affiliated companies sued three Xilinx competitors in Delaware.212 Xilinx and 
Intellectual Ventures had been in licensing discussions prior to the filing of the lawsuit;213 Xilinx is 
also apparently an investor in Intellectual Ventures.214 
¶206 In the California lawsuit, Intellectual Ventures and Xilinx engaged in a battle of motions 
concerning whether the disclosure could be filed under seal or for attorneys’ eyes only, rather than 
                                                
204 C.D. Cal. R. 7.1-1, available at http://www.cacd.uscourts.gov (click “Local Rules” link, then search for “7.1” and select 
“F.R.Civ.P. 7.1 Disclosure Statement”). 
205 N.D. Cal. R. 3-16, available at http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/filelibrary/3/Civ6-11.pdf (referring to definitions from 28 
U.S.C. § 455).  
206 See Defendants’ Certificate Of Interested Entities Or Persons Pursuant To Civil Local Rule 3-16 and F.R.C.P. 7.1, Xilinx v. 
Invention Investment Fund I LP, No. 11-CV-0671 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2011). 
207 Oasis Research, LLC v. Adrive, No. 4:10-CV-00435-MHS ALM (E.D. Tex. filed Aug. 30, 2010). The case is still pending. 
208 Rule 7.1 Disclosure Statement, Oasis Research, LLC v. Adrive, No. 4:10-CV-00435-MHS-ALM (E.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2010). 
209 Plaintiff Oasis Research, LLC’s Disclosure Pursuant To The Court’s Order To Meet, Report And Appear At Scheduling 
Conference, Oasis Research, LLC v. Adrive, No. 4:10-CV-00435-MHS-ALM (E.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2010). 
210 See Blumberg & Sydell, supra note 5. 
211 Xilinx v. Invention Investment Fund I LP, No. 11-CV-0671 (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 14, 2011). 
212 Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Altera Corp, No. 1:10-CV-01065-LPS (D. Del. filed Dec. 8, 2010). 
213 See Intellectual Ventures Motion to Dismiss at 6, 9, Xilinx v. Invention Investment Fund I LP, No. 11-CV-0671 (N.D. Cal. 
filed Apr. 11, 2011) (Intellectual Ventures describes its negotiations with Xilinx as “routine patent licensing discussions” but 
concedes that after two months of negotiations, the parties had not even agreed to a non-disclosure agreement that would “allow 
more detailed technical discussions to proceed”).  
214 Of the four Intellectual Ventures funds listed in Intellectual Ventures’ disclosure of interested parties, Xilinx is listed as a 
potentially interested party in two of the funds. Defendants’ Certificate Of Interested Entities Or Persons Pursuant To Civil Local 
Rule 3-16 and F.R.C.P. 7.1, Xilinx v. Invention Investment Fund I LP, No. 11-CV-0671 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2011). 
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publicly. As the parties’ motions began flying across the judge’s bench, the judge recused herself, 
presumably because she became aware of the identities of the interested parties, and a new judge was 
appointed.215 The new judge accepted Xilinx’ arguments and the Intellectual Ventures parties 
disclosed publicly a list of investors including more than 50 entities, such as the World Bank, the 
Mayo Clinic, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, and several universities.216 
¶207 In Xilinx, the court has now dismissed several of the Intellectual Ventures parties on the grounds 
that they were not the legal owners for some of the patents specifically mentioned in Xilinx’s 
declaratory judgment action.217 The legal owners for these patents include some seven other 
Intellectual Ventures shell companies,218 and the California judge has transferred this portion of the 
lawsuit to Delaware.219 So, the network of affiliated shell companies seems to have served Intellectual 
Ventures well in this case because its network was so vast that Xilinx did not identify the formal 
owner among a group of extremely related parties, allowing transfer of portions of the case to 
Delaware. The case is a cautionary tale for any company targeted by a mass aggregator that one 
should pay careful attention to who actually owns the patents being pushed in a licensing campaign, 
as opposed to who is doing the licensing negotiation or who may ultimately receive the funds from 
the licensing or litigation. Thus, for example, when a licensing target decides to file a declaratory 
judgment action based on a campaign launched by Chilly Willy Licensing, LLC for the benefit of 
Chilly Willy Licensing Partners LP, the target should make sure to name Chilly Willy Patent Holding 
LLC in the complaint and be grateful that the corporate names include their function in the overall 
enterprise—otherwise, Chilly Willy Patent Holding will file its own complaint in the jurisdiction of its 
choosing while Chilly Willy Licensing seeks dismissal from the declaratory judgment action on 
grounds that it is not the patent owner. 
¶208 Outside the disclosure requirements designed for judicial recusal, entities have considerable 
ability to camouflage their ownership. Most states offer corporate forms that allow companies to 
shield the identity of their owners, typically in the context of a limited liability company (“LLC”) 
format. In some states, such as Delaware, no public information is provided regarding the owners of 
such companies. Other states, such as Nevada, allow limited public disclosure of an LLC’s 
management, although the disclosure is also too limited to identify the ultimate owners or the names 
of real persons responsible for their day-to-day affairs. 
¶209 For private actors in patent litigation against mass aggregator shell companies, finding the 
identity of the owners or investors is only one hurdle; holding the owners or investors liable for the 
activities of the shell corporation is far more difficult. Under most circumstances, a corporation is 
regarded as a legal entity separate and distinct from its stockholders, officers, directors, and investors. 
When a corporation is used by another entity to perpetrate fraud, circumvent a statute, or accomplish 
some other wrongful or inequitable purpose, however, a court may pierce the corporate veil and treat 
the corporation’s acts as if they were done by those controlling the corporation.220 
¶210 In battles over piercing the corporate veil, the structures being adopted by some of the mass 
aggregators may be helpful in protecting them. A key predicate in piercing the corporate veil 
                                                
215 Judge Koh recused herself from the case on April 28, 2011. Order of Recusal, Xilinx v. Invention Investment Fund I LP, 
No. 11-CV-00671-LHK (ND Cal. Apr. 28, 2011). Judge Koh became a Superior Court judge in 2008 and a federal judge as 
recently as 2010; prior to that she was in private practice. By contrast, Judge Illston, who was assigned to the case after Judge Koh, 
has been a federal judge since 1995. 
216 Defendants’ Certificate Of Interested Entities Or Persons Pursuant To Civil Local Rule 3-16 and F.R.C.P. 7.1, Xilinx v. 
Invention Investment Fund I LP, No. 11-CV-0671 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2011). 
217 See Order Re: Motions To Enjoin, Dismiss And/Or Transfer, Xilinx v. Invention Investment Fund I LP, No. 11-CV-0671 
(N.D. Cal. July 27, 2011). 
218 Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss Xilinx’s Complaint For Declaratory Judgment, Xilinx v. Invention Investment Fund I LP, 
No. 11-CV-0671 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2011) (the chart on page 12, lines 6-11 identifies the owners of the patents subject to 
declaratory judgment as Intellectual Ventures affiliates Detelle Relay KG, LLC, Roldan Block NY, LLC, Latrosse Technologies, 
LLC, TR Technologies Foundation LLC, Taichi Holdings, LLC, Noregin Assets N.V., LLC, and Intellectual Venture Funding 
LLC). 
219 See supra note 211. 
220 See, e.g., Communist Party v. 522 Valencia, Inc., 35 Cal. App. 4th 980, 993 (1995). 
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concerns the presence or absence of distinct legal entities.221 Some mass aggregators, such as 
Intellectual Ventures and Transpacific, are structured so that each layer is a distinct legal entity, 
providing a measure of protection. Courts are extremely reluctant to pierce the corporate veil in most 
circumstances,222 and the carefully crafted legal structures will make it particularly difficult to 
disregard the corporate form. 
¶211 Piercing the corporate veil is less of a direct issue for antitrust actions brought by either private 
plaintiffs or competition authorities. Under those circumstances, the mass aggregator and its shell 
company or third-party privateer could conceivably be charged with concerted action in violation of 
the antitrust laws.223 At the very least, however, such actions would require alteration of the 
definition of relevant markets, as well as an enhanced system for monitoring relevant behavior. 
C. Removing the Teeth of the Tiger 
¶212 We cannot close the article without highlighting the systemic problems giving rise to the 
phenomenon of mass aggregation. One must keep in mind the peculiar elements that have brought 
us to the point at which large, respectable companies feel the need to sign onto patent defense funds. 
These are the same elements that make mass aggregation activity so potentially troubling. 
¶213 Troll behavior, whether small or aggregated, is fueled by a patent system that lacks a cost-
effective method of quickly resolving validity and infringement questions. There are better uses for 
federal courts than using them as forums for conducting licensing negotiations. A copious supply of 
patents that are only lightly tested at the time of the grant enhances the problem. As long as 
insufficient information, uncertainty, and high transaction costs reign, troll activity will continue to 
flourish. We should focus our efforts not only on limiting troubling behavior among mass 
aggregators but also on making trolling a less lucrative endeavor in the first instance. 
CONCLUSION 
¶214 The patent world is poised to undergo a change of astounding proportions. A system that has 
operated such that the vast majority of patents bring little or no return is shifting to a system in 
which a substantial number of patents will become traded and monetized, largely through a system of 
mass aggregators. The giants among us are undoubtedly changing the patent world. The question that 
remains is how. 
¶215 One could argue that mass aggregators could potentially have positive effects. Mass aggregators 
might potentially ensure that the forgotten inventor receives the compensation due or could serve as 
a middleman to connect inventors with capital and expertise. Mass aggregators could also serve as 
litigation defense funds, providing Just-in-Time patenting and creating a powerful weapon stream 
that will deter troublesome infringement suits. Mass aggregators may also reduce troll activity by 
soaking up the supply of monetizable patents. The question, however, is whether the cure is worse 
than the disease. 
¶216 In particular, the same market characteristics that have led to the rise of troll activity are likely to 
plague the activities of mass aggregators as well. Without changing the basic incentive structures of 
the patent system, mass aggregation will be no better than the current patent system at rewarding the 
deserving inventor and greasing the wheels of innovation while protecting diligent producing 
companies. Moreover, the activity of mass aggregation brings its own potential harms. Rather than 
contributing technological innovations, mass aggregators operate as a tax on current production, 
burdening existing products and potentially reducing future innovation and productivity. In addition, 
                                                
221 See Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 470-71 (2000). 
222 See, e.g., Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Ct., 83 Cal. App. 4th 523, 539 (2000) (noting that alter ego [piercing the 
corporate veil] is an extreme remedy, sparingly used); accord Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 475 (2003). 
223 One might also try to establish that third-party privateers were acting as agents on behalf of the mass aggregator. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1 (2006) (focusing on whether the purported agent acts on the principal's behalf and 
subject to the principal's control). 
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characteristics of the market for patent monetization make it an excellent vehicle for anticompetitive 
behavior, including horizontal collusion and single firm or multi-firm behavior that raises rivals’ 
costs. Most important, the basic business model of mass aggregation is troubling. The successful 
aggregator is likely to be the one that frightens the greatest number of companies in the most 
terrifying way. This may not be an activity that society wants to encourage. 
¶217 These and other concerns suggest that mass aggregators and the market for patent monetization 
should not be allowed to flourish unchecked. The burgeoning market must be properly monitored, 
regulated, and restricted so that the considerable risks associated with this activity may be fully 
contemplated and cabined. 
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APPENDIX A: UNIVERSITIES 
• Alabama, University of 
• Brigham Young University 
• Bristol, University of 
• British Columbia, University of 
• Brunel University 
• California Institute of Technology 
• California, the Regents of the University of 
• Campinas State University (Brazil) 
• City University London 
• Clemson University 
• Connecticut, University of 
• Darmstadt, Technical University of 
• Duke University 
• Florida Institute Of Technology 
• Florida, University of  
• Helsinki University of Technology  
• Hiroshima University 
• Hong Kong University 
• Indian Institute of Technology - Bombay 
• Kyushu University 
• Manitoba, University of 
• McMaster University 
• Monash University 
• New Jersey Institute of Technology 
• New Mexico, University of  
• New South Wales, University of 
• North Carolina at Charlotte, University of 
• Oklahoma, University of 
• Ottawa, University of 
• Oulu, University of 
• Polytechnic University 
• Ramot at Tel Aviv University 
• Rhode Island University 
• Rochester Institute Of Technology 
• Rochester, University of 
• Rutgers University 
• Singapore, National University of 
• Southern Mississippi, University of 
• Stevens Institute Of Technology 
• Stirling, University Of 
• Strathclyde, University of 
• Texas, University System, the Board Of Regents 
• University of California San Diego 
• Western Sydney, University of 
• Westminster, University of 
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APPENDIX B 
Investors in Various Intellectual Ventures Funds as Reported by Intellectual Ventures  
in Xilinx v. Intellectual Ventures Investment Fund I, L.P. et al. on May 16, 2011 
 














Adobe Systems Incorporated  Financial 
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3.  American Express Travel 
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11.  Nvidia International Holdings, 
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 Entity related to the 
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LLC 









19.  Commonfund Capital Venture 





 Verne Sedlacek is 
president & CEO 




Diana H. Frazier 
and Peter Lawrence 
co-founded Flag 
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21.  JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., as 






 It is not clear who 
are the beneficiaries 
of the White Plaza 
Group Trust. 
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related to Flag 
Capital 
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founded by David 
Beisner 
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27.  The Board of Trustees of the 
















The Archibald Bush 
Foundation was 
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former 3M 
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VI-A, L.P. 




Founded by William 
Hewlett and Flora 
Hewlett. 
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Reconstruction and 





The IBRD is one of 
five banks that 
comprise the World 
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Russ Hall, Alan 
Marty, and Chris 
Eyre are the 
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37.  Mayo Clinic and Mayo 

























hospital located in 
Reading, Penn. 
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Allen & Co. 
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Holiber, president 
of Summit Equity 








This would appear 





at Allen & 
Company LLC 
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¶1 This appendix summarizes the methodology employed in uncovering Intellectual Ventures 
patent holdings.1  Our methodology relies on two broad categories of similarities among the 1,276 
Intellectual Ventures shells that we have identified.  We will term the first category “corporate 
similarities” and the second category “patent prosecution similarities.”  These two sets of similarities 
are reasonably independent of each other and thus provide some confidence that a suspected shell 
company has a relationship with Intellectual Ventures. 
¶2 We first reviewed the open literature about Intellectual Ventures.  Many of these articles 
identified a few of Intellectual Ventures’ shell companies.2  Other articles identified companies that 
had purportedly sold or licensed patents to Intellectual Ventures.  We next reviewed corporate 
records for those publicly identified Intellectual Ventures shell companies.  After observing 
similarities in the structure of these shell companies, we expanded our investigation to look for other 
companies sharing the same characteristics.   
¶3 Using this initial list of shell companies, we searched the US Patent & Trademark Office’s 
assignment database to find which companies were listed as the assignees or licensees of patents 
and/or published applications.  Where possible, we attempted to find public information about the 
transactions involved.  We performed this process iteratively several times in order to expand the list 
of shell companies.  Thus, the first phase of our research comprised looking for “corporate 
similarities” among suspected shell companies. 
¶4 The second phase of our research concerned reviewing “patent prosecution similarities.”  In this 
phase, we reviewed the patent portfolios of the shell companies to look for active cases—pending 
applications, continuations, and reissue applications—under the assumption that the new owner 
would have likely filed a new power of attorney in order to take over prosecution of the case from 
the previous owner.3  We also reviewed assignment data for the patents where available.  We 
assumed that the information gleaned from these information sources would provide independent 
support for the “corporate similarities” uncovered in the first phase and in many cases actually 
include the name of an Intellectual Ventures executive, employee, or agent.  We then integrated the 
results of our findings, conducting further research into Intellectual Ventures’ corporate organization 
and its apparent business plans. 
¶5 Finally, we prepared integrated lists of the patents and published applications for the shell 
companies that we found.4  This phase also included determining the first International Patent 
Classification (IPC) class for the patents and applications since the Intellectual Ventures portfolio 
need not necessarily have a single specific technology focus.  If this portfolio contained fewer than 
100 patents, then it might be sufficient to simply list the patents by number and title.  However, with 
11,000+ patents and pending applications spread across a variety of technologies, understanding this 
portfolio suggests that the patents also be organized by technical subject matter. 
                                                
1 The methodology discussed here describes techniques that enabled author Tom Ewing to create an initial survey of 
Intellectual Ventures’ holdings in 2007.  The data have been expanded and updated with the most recent version in May 2011. On 
the model of Lex Machina, which was originally a project of Stanford Law School, the database is available for a cost to 
commercial entities from author Tom Ewing. Certain use of the database is available on different terms to academics. 
2 See, e.g., Victoria Slind-Flor, IV Moves From Myth To Reality, 32 Intellectual Asset Management August/September 2006 
(the article identifies 48 Intellectual Ventures shell companies). 
3 See, e.g., 37 CFR 1.32 Power of Attorney, available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/consolidated_rules.pdf and Manual of Patent Examining Procedure Sec. 402; 
available online at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/documents/0400_402.htm#sect402.  
4 We provide detailed listings of patents in our full Intellectual Ventures report. 
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¶6 The documents found during this investigation provide a rich source of information that further 
link the apparent shell companies to Intellectual Ventures and suggest avenues for future research.  
After providing an overview of our methodology, we will discuss how our methodology was 
employed to discover two specific Intellectual Ventures shell companies.  These shell companies are 
Ben Franklin Patent Holding, LLC and Northstar Acquisitions, LLC.  Ben Franklin Patent Holding, 
LLC is a fairly well-known Intellectual Ventures shell company that has been mentioned in several 
articles about Intellectual Ventures.5  Ben Franklin is also a fairly easy shell company to trace to 
Intellectual Ventures because its portfolio came from another Intellectual Ventures shell named 
Intellectual Ventures Patent Holding I, LLC in a transaction conducted on Nov. 18, 2003.6  
Northstar Acquisitions, LLC is another company that we suspected was an Intellectual Ventures shell 
based, among other things, on certain similarities that Northstar shares with Ben Franklin.  We 
eventually found documents signed by an Intellectual Venture employee/agent who had also signed 
documents for Ben Franklin.  To our knowledge, Northstar had not been identified as an Intellectual 
Ventures shell company prior to our original 2007 report. 
B. Corporate Similarities 
¶7 We first studied Intellectual Ventures’ apparent corporate structure, focusing primarily on the 
shell companies.  We next studied the available corporate information about these publicly identified 
shell companies in order to find characteristics or features that might reveal other shell companies.  
We noticed that all of the publicly identified shell companies were of the “limited liability company,” 
or “LLC” form.  We further noticed that the publicly identified shell companies were generally 
registered in either Delaware or Nevada. 
¶8 We also noted that the sole addresses for the Delaware companies were: 
 
• 2711 Centerville Road Suite 400, Wilmington, DE 19808, 
• 1209 Orange Street, Wilmington, DE 19801, or 
• 160 Greentree Drive Suite 101, Dover, DE 19904 
 
These addresses correspond to addresses for the three largest registered agency firms in the US.  The 
Centerville Road address is the address for the Corporation Service Company (CSC).  The Orange 
Street address is the address for the Corporation Trust Company (CTC), and the Greentree Drive 
address is the address for National Registered Agents, Inc. (NRA).7 
¶9 Similarly, the Nevada registered companies have addresses that correspond to the Nevada 
address for these same registered agency firms.  For example, many companies have the CSC’s 
Centerville Road address listed for Delaware and CSC’s 2215-B Renaissance Drive, Suite 5, Las 
Vegas, NV 89119 address as their registered Nevada address.8 
¶10 The organization of the Nevada registered companies allowed us to find additional shell 
companies.  For example, the listed manager in Nevada for the three publicly identified Intellectual 
Ventures shells Poulsen Transmitter LLC, Smeaton Pump LLC, and Twain Typesetting LLC is 
“Gigaloo LLC.”9  We were curious to see if Gigaloo LLC was the manager for any other companies 
                                                
5 Sind-Flor, supra note 2. 
6 See, e.g., Reel/Frame: 014770/0486, US Patent Office Assignment Database for US Patent No. 5675811, recording the 
change of name from  Intellectual Ventures Patent Holding I, L.L.C. to  Ben Franklin Patent Holding LLC, available at 
http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/q?db=pat&reel=014770&frame=0486 (last visited Nov. 30, 2011.). 
7 See, Delaware Authorized Searchers, Delaware Secretary of State, which lists all three companies at these addresses; available 
at http://corp.delaware.gov/uccauthsrch.shtml (last visited Nov. 30, 2011). 
8 See, e.g., LVL Patent Group, LLC v. DirectTV, Inc., Echostar Technologies, L.L.C; Echostar 
Corporation and Dish Network L.L.C., 1:99-mc-09999 (D. Del. 2011) (“EchoStar Corp. has appointed CSC Services of 
Nevada, Inc., 2215-B Renaissance Drive, Las Vegas, Nevada 89118, as its agent for service of process.”), available at: 
http://morrisjames.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/lvl-patent-group-llc-v-directv-inc-et-al.pdf.  
9 On the Nevada Secretary of State business entity website, select “officer” and enter “Gigaloo” in the “last name” field.  The 
search will produce these 10 companies managed by Gigaloo, LLC.  We first performed this search on May 30, 2007 and most 
recently performed it on Nov. 30, 2011; website available at http://nvsos.gov/sosentitysearch/corpsearch.aspx.  
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in Nevada.  Our inquiry revealed that seven other companies—Ayscough Visuals LLC, Fahrenheit 
Thermoscope LLC, Hollerith Statistics LLC, Maiman Laser Systems LLC, McGill Fastenings LLC, 
Newcomen Engine LLC, and Ochoa Optics LLC—were also managed by Gigaloo.  We observed 
that these seven companies also shared the characteristics that drew us to the first three shell 
companies.   
¶11 As a backup test, we spot checked the USPTO assignment database and discovered that all 10 
Gigaloo-managed companies, except for McGill Fastenings, were assigned patents in transactions 
recorded from 2004-200710.  As a further test, we spot-checked this list to see if any of these 
companies seemed to have a presence on the web that indicated actual commercial activity.  For 
example, could we find any mention of Hollerith Statistics LLC as a going entity with an actual office 
and an actual staff?  For the companies that we spot-checked, we found nothing.   
¶12 This process led us to notice additional commonalities among these companies.  For example, 
we noticed that many of Intellectual Ventures’ early shell companies have two-part names that are 
either derived from the work of a famous artist or scientist (e.g., Steinbeck Cannery LLC), or contain 
a color (e.g., Purple Mountain Server), or a geographical location (e.g., Baldwyn Brices Cross Roads11).  
We later observed that some of the shells seemed to have been named after minerals and other 
chemical compositions.   
¶13 We further observed that many of the shell companies were also created in both Delaware and 
Nevada on similar, if not the same, dates.  For example, of the 51 management companies, 34 were 
incorporated in Delaware on Sept. 7, 2004, and all the companies managed by Algorythm LLC were 
created on March 17, 2005.12  We also noticed that some shell companies seemed to have been 
formed in Nevada only and have no Delaware counterpart.  We have similarly observed that other 
shell companies have been formed in Delaware only with no Nevada counterpart. 
¶14 Our list of corporate characteristics for the Nevada companies eventually included:  1) LLC 
corporate form, 2) a Nevada corporation, or a Delaware corporation also registered in Nevada, 3) 
identical addresses for registered agents in Delaware and Nevada, 4) similar dates of corporate 
formation, 5) recipient of patents assigned/licensed between 2000-2007, 6) no corporate existence 
prior to Intellectual Ventures’ formation in 2000, 7) no recorded patents prior to Intellectual 
Ventures’ formation in 2000, 8) management by a company having a one-word name that also has 
the LLC corporate form, and 9) approximately 10 companies under management by the LLC 
management company where none of the 10 companies seemed to have an independent commercial 
existence. 
C. Patent Prosecution Similarities 
¶15 A patent prosecution file history may provide information about who owns a patent and/or the 
company ostensibly prosecuting the patent.  When a patent or pending application is purchased, the 
new owner will not only want to register his ownership of the patent with the USPTO, he will also 
want to assume control over the prosecution of any pending patent applications.13  In order to 
assume control, the patent owner must file a new power of attorney with the USPTO and must also 
                                                
10 We conducted this research in preparation for the first edition of our report in 2007.  Searches for later editions did not 
terminate in 2007.  We note that McGill Fastenings had no patents recorded against its name in 2007 and in 2011 still has no 
patents recorded against its name, according to the USPTO assignment database.  This does not mean that the company holds no 
patent rights. 
11 We noticed that the names of some Intellectual Ventures shells, such as Baldwyn Brices Cross Roads, curiously seemed to 
be found in a sample template available with the Shoebox program for organizing photographs by their content.  This may be mere 
coincidence or it might possibly provide some support for the rumor that the names of Intellectual Ventures shells are selected by 
a computer.  One Shoebox template can be found at: 
http://www.kavasoft.com/Shoebox/categories/examples/Things/National_Parks.html.  
12 Algorythm LLC manages Reverb Communications LLC, Teledata Sound LLC, Home Systems LLC, Portable Management 
LLC, Null Networks LLC, Meyer Cordless LLC, Mobile Lines LLC, Discobolus Management LLC, Logic Data Funds LLC, And 
Redirection LLC.  This search can be replicated by entering “Algorithm” in the “first name” field and “LLC” in the last name field 
for “officer” on the Nevada Secretary of State’s website.  If one then checks the history for each of the companies, one sees that 
they were all registered in Nevada on March 17, 2005.   
13 Supra note 3. 
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typically file a statement that shows a chain of title.  These documents are typically signed by a person 
working for, or authorized by the new owner.14  Thus, these documents provide an opportunity to 
find the name of a person associated with the patent-owning company. 
¶16 For example, Creative Mines LLC is a company that had not been identified as an Intellectual 
Ventures shell prior to our 2007 report.  Using the corporate similarities methodology discussed 
above, we found Creative Mines by first finding Searete LLC, which is a publicly identified 
Intellectual Ventures shell company.  We next located the manager for Searete in Nevada, which is 
Nevada Licensing Manager LLC.15  We next searched for other companies managed by Nevada 
Licensing Manager, which led us to, led us to consider Creative Mines.  When we searched for 
agreements involving Creative Mines, we found the following agreement16 which not only identifies 




¶17 The 1756—114th Ave. SE, Ste. 110, Bellevue, Washington address has been Intellectual 
Ventures’ address.17  This address may be found in numerous Intellectual Ventures documents, 
including the self-reported employer address of Intellectual Ventures provided by co-founder Greg 
Gorder on the Washington State Bar Association website, which is provided below.  Thus, a 
company found only by the methodology laid out above was shown to be linked to Intellectual 
Ventures by reviewing the patent file history for a patent owned by the shell company. 
¶18 The power of attorney document for the Creative Mines patent applications was signed by Greg 
Gorder who also placed his personal assistant’s phone number at Intellectual Ventures on the power 
of attorney document.18  This phone number has Intellectual Ventures’ main exchange but is slightly 
different from the number that Gorder provided to the Washington State Bar Association.19 
 
                                                
14 Id. 
15 See notes 196-199 in the main article. 
16 The agreement may be found on the USPTO’s PAIR database under patent application 09/821,694 (now US Patent 
6,949,340; select the “Image File Wrapper” tab and then select the PDF for the document “Oath or Declaration” filed on June 28, 
2005.  The selection above is found on page 2.  The PAIR website may be accessed at 
http://portal.uspto.gov/external/portal/pair.  
17 See, e.g., Matt Rainey, “Comments on NPRM re Reexam rules,” USPTO website, available at: 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/comments/ab77/iv.pdf.  
18 Supra note 16 at 1. 
19 See, Greg Gorder entry on the Washington State Bar Association webpage; search originally conducted June 14, 2007; 
search repeated Nov. 30, 2011 with same results but for updated address for Intellectual Ventures; WSBA lawyer directory 
available at: http://www.mywsba.org/default.aspx?tabid=178&RedirectTabId=177&Usr_ID=15288.  
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¶19 Gorder also signed the power of attorney document for the Point Reyes National Liquidator 





D. Two Shell Companies—Ben Franklin and Northstar Acquisitions 
¶20 Both Ben Franklin and Northstar Acquisitions are Delaware corporations.21  Both companies 
were registered as foreign corporations in Nevada on Oct. 1, 2004.22  The registered address for both 
companies in Delaware is 2711 Centerville Road Suite 400, Wilmington, DE 19808.  The registered 
address for both companies in Nevada is 2215-B Renaissance Drive, Suite 5, Las Vegas, NV 89119.  
                                                
20 Power of Attorney for US Patent Application 10/364,979, filed Feb. 23, 2004, and signed by Greg Gorder; document 
available via USPTO PAIR database at http://portal.uspto.gov/external/portal/pair.  
21 Ben Franklin was formed in Delaware on April 22, 2003 and Northstar Acquisition was formed on March 27, 2003, 
according to the Delaware Secretary of State; available at https://delecorp.delaware.gov/tin/GINameSearch.jsp, enter “Ben 
Franklin Patent Holding” for the first search and “Northstar Acquisition” for the second search.  
22 See, the Nevada Secretary of State’s business entity website, available at https://delecorp.delaware.gov/tin/controller, for 
the first search, enter “Ben Franklin Patent Holding” in the “entity name” field and for the second search, enter “Northstar 
Acquisitions” in the “entity name” field. 
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Both companies have also used addresses in Los Altos, California, including the same address in Los 
Altos, which Intellectual Ventures co-founder Peter Detkin gave to the California Bar Association, 
the New York Bar Association, and the US Patent & Trademark Office.23  
¶21 Ben Franklin and Northstar share similarities in patent prosecution.  Documents filed in at least 
one pending application owned by Ben Franklin identify Peter Detkin, an Intellectual Ventures co-
founder, as the managing director of Ben Franklin.  Other documents filed with the US Patent & 
Trademark Office for Ben Franklin have been signed by attorney Julia Ceffalo.  Washington State 
Bar Association records indicate that Ms. Ceffalo is an attorney working for the Invention Law 
Group, PLLC, which seems to be an Intellectual Ventures-created law firm.24  As shown below, we 
have found powers of attorney signed by Ms. Ceffalo for both Ben Franklin and Northstar 
Acquisitions, linking Northstar Acquisition to Ben Franklin and thus to Intellectual Ventures itself. 25 
We have repeated this process with thousands of suspected Intellectual Ventures shell companies. 
¶22 Ben Franklin obtained a portfolio of 24 patents and 12 published applications from Intellectual 
Ventures Patent Holding I, LLC in a transaction which recognized that Intellectual Ventures Patent 
Holding I’s name had been changed to Ben Franklin.  Intellectual Ventures Patent Holding I 
obtained these patents from General Magic, Inc., a company that developed a pioneering PDA-like 
device in the early 1990s but closed its doors in 2002.26  Intellectual Ventures Patent Holding 
executed its agreement with General Magic, which was in voluntary bankruptcy, on April 22, 2003.27  
This agreement was recorded in the US Patent and Trademark Office on July 25, 2003.28 
¶23 The documents filed with the USPTO on Ben Franklin’s behalf bear the signatures of 
Intellectual Ventures co-founders Peter Detkin and Greg Gorder.  The documents also link 
Intellectual Ventures with a Los Altos address that is also found in at least 70 other patent files 
associated with some of the early Intellectual Ventures shell companies. 
¶24 As shown below, Gorder signed the original agreement with General Magic to obtain the patents 
that eventually became Ben Franklin’s portfolio29: 
 
 
                                                
23 We learned from Peter Detkin shortly after publication of our first edition that this address was his residential address, and 
while this address has been available on three public websites, we subsequently removed the address at Mr. Detkin’s request. 
24 However, Intellectual Ventures’ own automated telephone directory has  indicated that Ms. Ceffalo is an Intellectual 
Ventures employee, based on a call placed to Intellectual Ventures on June 15, 2007. 
25 We have found Ms. Ceffalo’s name on power of attorney documents filed with the USPTO for 139 different Intellectual 
Ventures shell companies. 
26 See, e.g., Wikipedia, “General Magic,” available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Magic.  
27 See, file history for US Patent Application 09/712,712, now US Patent No. 6,839,733, “Power of Attorney” filed on April 
28, 2004, pages 7-12 which provide the “Asset Purchase Agreement” (see “recitals”), file history available at 
http://portal.uspto.gov/external/portal/pair. 
28 USPTO Assignment Database, Reel/frame “014313/0813”, available at 
http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/q?db=pat&reel=014313&frame=0813.  
29 See, file history for US Patent Application 09/712,712, now US Patent No. 6,839,733, “Power of Attorney” filed on April 
28, 2004, page 8, file history available at http://portal.uspto.gov/external/portal/pair. 
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¶25 Even though one can find an assignment of the patents from Intellectual Ventures Patent 
Holding I to Ben Franklin in the USPTO’s assignment database, the two companies are actually the 
same company30.  In Nov. 2003, Gorder filed this amendment with the Delaware Division of 
Corporations changing the Intellectual Ventures Patent Holding’s name to Ben Franklin:31 
 
                                                
30 The USPTO database describes the transaction as a “change of name.” 
31 See, file history for US Patent Application 09/934,121, “Oath or Declaration” filed on May 20, 2004, page 8, file history 
available at http://portal.uspto.gov/external/portal/pair. (This document also exposes a management shell company called 
Acquisition Management LLC since Gorder signed as an officer of this company.) 
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¶26 Interestingly, both Gorder and Detkin have served as “managing directors” of Ben Franklin in a 
two-month time period, according to power of attorney documents filed in Intellectual Ventures 
cases.  The oldest document shows Detkin32 as managing director and the newer document shows 
Gorder as managing director33: 
 
 
                                                
32 See, file history for US Patent Application 09/712,712, now US Patent No. 6,839,733, “Power of Attorney” filed on April 
28, 2004, page 2, file history available at http://portal.uspto.gov/external/portal/pair.  
33 Supra note 29 at “Power of Attorney” filed on May 20, 2004. 
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¶27 More importantly, an even-later-filed power of attorney document by Intellectual Ventures’ 
attorney Julia Ceffalo associates the 171 Main Street, Los Altos address with Ben Franklin, and thus 
with Intellectual Ventures itself.  As noted above, this address is found in at least 70 other USPTO 
case files for the shell companies discussed in this report.34  
                                                
34 See, patent file history for US Application 11/314,002, now US Patent 7,266,499, power of attorney filed on Feb. 16, 2006, 
available at http://portal.uspto.gov/external/portal/pair in the “image file wrapper” tab under “power of attorney” for “02-16-
2006.” 
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¶28 The earliest Intellectual Ventures transaction that we have found occurred on Feb. 18, 2001 
between Purple Techno Solutions LLC and Venturemakers LLC of Campbell, Calif.35  Interestingly, 
Purple Techno Solutions did not become incorporated until Dec. 9, 2003.36  The Venturemakers’ 
transaction was not recorded with the USPTO until August 18, 2005, well after Purple Techno 
Solutions had been formed as a company.  A power of attorney for Purple Techno Solutions from 
2005 is provided below, which also links this company to the Los Altos address. 
 
                                                
35 See, USPTO Assignment Database for US Patent “6285986”, available at 
http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/q?db=pat&pat=6285986.  
36 See, Delaware Secretary of State business entity search available at https://delecorp.delaware.gov/tin/GINameSearch.jsp.  
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¶29 As noted above, Julia Ceffalo37 has also signed at least 139 power of attorney documents in 
Intellectual Ventures-related cases, including the authorization for Northstar Acquisition’s pending 
patent applications.38  To our knowledge, Northstar Acquisitions had not been previously identified 
as an Intellectual Ventures shell prior to the first edition of our report.  Ben Franklin and Northstar 
Acquisitions are Delaware corporations and both companies have the same registered addresses in 
Delaware and Nevada.  Interestingly, both companies have also used addresses in Los Altos, 
California -- including the address in Los Altos, which Intellectual Ventures co-founder Peter Detkin 
gave to the California Bar Association, the New York Bar Association, and the US Patent & 
Trademark Office.39 
                                                
37 Washington State Bar Association records for Julia Ceffalo first accessed on June 3, 2007 and most recently accessed on 
Nov. 30, 2007, record available at http://www.mywsba.org/default.aspx?tabid=178&RedirectTabId=177&Usr_ID=30460.  
38 See, prosecution file history for US Application 09/750,592, now US Patent 7,433,683, power of attorney filed on Sept. 7, 
2004, available at http://portal.uspto.gov/external/portal/pair under “Image File Wrapper.  
39 See, Northstar assignment records at reel/frame 018222/0226, available at the USPTO assignment database at 
http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/q?db=pat&reel=018222&frame=0226, and see California Bar Association record for 
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¶30 Northstar Acquisitions obtained a portfolio of 17 patents and 3 published applications from 
Pentech Financial Services, Inc. on July 22, 2003, the agreement for which was recorded on Sept. 12, 
2003.40  Pentech obtained the patents from Mobility Network Systems, Inc.  The portfolio appears to 
largely comprise the former assets of mDiversity, Inc., although some of the patents originated with 
SC-Wireless, Inc., SC-Wireless, Ltd., and Cellular Telecom, Ltd., and Hitachi Metals, Ltd. 
                                                                                                                                            
Peter Detkin, available at  http://members.calbar.ca.gov/fal/Member/Detail/134799,  originally accessed on June 3, 2007 and 
most recently accessed on Nov. 30, 2007, records are the same albeit a slight change in telephone number.   As noted, we learned 
from Peter Detkin shortly after publication of our first edition that this address was his residential address, and while this address is 
available on three public websites, we have obscured the address  at Mr. Detkin’s request. 
40 See, USPTO Assignment Records for US Patent “5751516,” available at 
http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/q?db=pat&pat=5751516.  
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